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TRANSPORTATION, COOPERATION AND 
HARMONIZATION: GATS AS A GATEWAY 
TO INTEGRATING THE UN SEABORNE 
CARGO REGIMES INTO THE WTO 
Lijun Zhao* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to analyze how the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) may cooperate with the United Nations (UN) to unify sea-
borne cargo regimes. Beginning with the current dilemma of uni-
form maritime transport regime, the paper explores the relation-
ship between the UN and the WTO. In light of the successful 
precedent of the incorporation of the UN intellectual property re-
gime into the WTO, this paper probes into the feasibility that the 
UN and the WTO may interactively unify a maritime transport 
regime by reference to selected previous treaties, which include 
UN-administrated treaties. This paper argues the WTO-based 
sea transport negotiations do not start from a zero basis so that it 
can be traced backwards to negotiating the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS). Having scrutinized the progress 
and regress in the negotiations so far under the WTO framework, 
this paper stresses the potential role of an annex on sea transport 
to the GATS so as to address the issue of harmonization. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Maritime transport is a significant facilitator of world 
trade with approximately four-fifths of goods (by volume) being 
carried by sea and is an important service sector that makes 
significant contributions to some national Gross Domestic 
Products (GDP).1 Concerning the harmonization of the mari-
time transport regime, the literature is unevenly focused on the 
United Nations (UN) and the world trading system (including 
the predecessor General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)2 system and the current World Trade Organization 
(WTO)3 system.4  Traditionally, the harmonization of the mari-
time transport regimes have been negotiated under the UN, 
                                                            
* Lecturer in law, Middlesex University, the United Kingdom; Fellow of 
the Society of Legal Scholars, and the British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law. LL.B. and LL.M (China University of Political Science and 
Law), PhD (University of Wales, Bangor). Research interest: WTO, maritime 
and commercial law; Email: l.zhao@mdx.ac.uk. An early draft of this paper 
combined with economic justification for the unification of transport law has 
been presented at the Forums of National University of Ireland and the (Brit-
ish) Society of Legal Scholars, thanks to Professors D. Rhidian Thomas and 
Wei Shi and their enlightening comments for this paper. 
1 Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication 
from Australia, Canada, Chile, the People’s Republic of China, Croatia, Cy-
prus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia, The European Commu-
nities and their Member States, Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
China, Iceland, India, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pa-
kistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slo-
venia, Switzerland, and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu, TN/S/W/11, at 1 (March 3, 2003). 
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ 
gatt47_01_e.htm [hereinafter GATT]; see generally The GATT Years: From 
Havana to Marrakesh, WTO (2013), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (GATT, which was replaced by the WTO in 1995, 
was a provisional agreement that entered into force in January 1948 and was 
designed to be terminated by the treaty creating the International Trade Or-
ganization (ITO). However, the ITO had not come into force, so the GATT was 
continued and integrated into the WTO in 1995). 
3 See generally GATT, supra note 2 (The GATT system was incorporated 
into the WTO system in 1995. The GATT has two meanings: first it was a 
provisional agreement (GATT 1947) that entered into force in January 1948; 
second, the GATT was a predecessor (machinery) which was imparted into 
the WTO system in 1995. 
4 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement], avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm. 
3
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but the UN framework has demonstrated shortcomings in ful-
filling this task. Although the UN endeavors to foster a uni-
form regime by drafting the Rotterdam Rules,5 it will not easily 
replace the earlier effective conventions of The Hague,6 Visby,7 
and Hamburg8 Rules to form a uniform regime worldwide.9 
Moreover, the UN system of enforcement does not have the 
administrative framework at the international level to safe-
guard the application of these seaborne cargo conventions. 10  
Enormous emphasis has been placed on analyzing UN 
treaties;11 little scholarship, however, has been devoted to the 
harmonization of the maritime transport regime under the 
WTO.12 Moreover, there has been no literature looking at the 
WTO’s capacity to address issues of harmonizing sea transport.  
Due to wide participation and a center-administrated im-
plementation system, the WTO can make up these two pitfalls 
of the current UN approach to harmonization – restricted scope 
of coverage and the lack of central administration in implemen-
tation. The aim of this paper is to refocus on the WTO. The pa-
per will examine the feasibility of harmonizing international 
sea transport regimes through cooperation between the UN 
and the WTO in the following three sections:  
Section II will briefly compare and contrast the UN system 
                                                            
5 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage 
of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, G.A. Res. 63/122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/122 
(Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Rotterdam Rules].  
6 Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relat-
ing to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter Hague 
Rules]. 
7 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412 U.N.T.S 
121 [hereinafter Visby Rules].  
8  United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 
1978, 1695 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Hamburg Rules]. 
9 See, e.g., Anthony Diamond, The Rotterdam Rules, LLOYD’S MAR. AND 
COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY 445, 535 (2009). 
10 Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International 
Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969, 982 (2006). 
11  See Comité Maritime International, Bibliography on the Rotterdam 
Rules (2013); e.g. Anthony Diamond, The Rotterdam Rules, Lloyd’s Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 445–536 (2009). 
12 See generally Benjamin Parameswaran, The Liberalization of Maritime 
Transport Services: With Special Reference to the WTO/GATS Framework 
(2004); J. Michael Taylor, Evaluating the Continuing GATS Negotiations 
Concerning International Maritime Transport Services, 27 Tul. Mar. L. J. 
129-95 (2002). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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and the world trading system from the perspective of sea cargo 
transport.  
Section III will demonstrate the feasibility of the harmoni-
zation of the sea transport regime under the WTO without 
prejudice to the UN’s respective conventions. The WTO has 
successfully harmonized the intellectual property (IP) regime 
that is similar to sea transport law,13 as they have five aspects 
in common.14 Thus, a successful precedent from the “Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement” (TRIPS)15 
sheds light on the unification of sea transport law under the 
world trading system.16 Accordingly, an approach of selective 
reference, in which the WTO cooperates with the UN and uni-
fies the IP regime, will fulfill the task of harmonizing maritime 
transport law.  
With respect to the historical connection between the WTO 
and sea transport, Section IV will argue that the maritime 
transport negotiations at the WTO negotiating forum does not 
start from a zero basis. Section IV will further evaluate the his-
tory of WTO maritime transport related negotiations under the 
“General Agreement on Trade in Services” (GATS),17 produce 
progress upon which further negotiations can be built on, and 
identify setbacks that was problematic and that needed to be 
amended in further negotiations.18  
                                                            
13 Sea transport conventions and the intellectual property rights conven-
tions are under the UN administration. See, e.g., Visby Rules, supra note 7; 
see also TRIPS Agreement, infra note 15.  
14 See infra Part III. IP in the section Cooperation between the WTO and 
the UN. 
15 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
16 See infra Part III.  
17 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 B, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf.  
18 See infra Part IV; see also Special Session of the Council for Trade in 
Services, Decision on Maritime Transport Services, S/L/94 at 1 (July 3, 1996) 
(providing the suspension and resumption of the negotiations on maritime 
transport services). 
5
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II. COMPARISON OF TWO APPROACHES TO UNIFY TRANSPORT 
LAW: THE WTO AND THE UN 
A. Multi-Forums of Shipping Related Negotiations and the 
Need to Harmonize 
Although they are two independent organizations, the 
WTO and the UN actively connect to each other. The emer-
gence of the world trading system19 can be traced back to 
1947.20 In that year, the UN’s Conference of Trade and Em-
ployment adopted the Havana Charter for the International 
Trade Organization (ITO)21 that aimed to establish a multilat-
eral trade organization.22 Although the ITO never came into 
force, the Havana Charter was partially integrated into the 
WTO.23  
Furthermore, the cooperation between the two organiza-
tions is deeply rooted in the WTO agreements. In general, the 
legal basis of the WTO-UN relation is governed by the “Ar-
rangements for Effective Cooperation with Other Intergovern-
mental Organizations-Relations between the WTO and the 
UN.”24 Additionally, the GATS and GATT, two cardinal compo-
nents of the WTO Agreements, specify collaborative relation-
ships with other international organizations, 25 which provide 
                                                            
19 For a summary of the function and history of the GATT, see John H. 
Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence 15-
35 (1998) (discussing the strengths and limitations of the WTO and how it 
will need to adapt to meet new demands from the perspectives of the consti-
tutional structure and dispute settlement procedures); see also John H. Jack-
son, The Jurisprudence of GATT & The WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and 
Economic Relations 408-10 (2000).  
20 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, 
Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947- Mar. 24, 1948, Final Act of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78 (1948) [hereinafter 
Havana Charter], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 Compare id. with GATT, supra note 2. (The chapter on Commercial 
Policy within the Havana Charter was integrated into the GATT (1948) sys-
tem).  
24 Arrangements for Effective Cooperation with Other Intergovernmental 
Organizations-Relations between the WTO and the United Nations, available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_un_e.htm, (governing the 
WTO-UN relation, which was signed on 15 November 1995 in the same year 
as the WTO established).  
25 See GATS, supra note 17, art. XXVI (providing “The General Council 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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the legal basis for the cooperation with the UN and its special-
ized agencies on shipping.  
In considering the multi-forum maritime transport, it is 
worthwhile to boost further cooperation. There are a number of 
UN specialized agencies handling shipping issues.26 The Unit-
ed Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD),27 Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD),28 and United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC)29 have published statistical data on the 
shipping industry for years.30 These are considerable resources 
of background information for further GATS-based maritime 
transport negotiations. For example, UNCTAD has published 
“The Review of Maritime Transport” yearly since 1968.31 More-
over, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL),32 and the International Maritime Organization 
                                                                                                                                     
shall make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with 
the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as with other inter-
governmental organizations concerned with services.”); see also GATT, supra 
note 2, art. XXXVI(7) (stating “There is need for appropriate collaboration be-
tween the CONTRACTING PARTIES, other intergovernmental bodies and 
the organs and agencies of the United Nations system, whose activities relate 
to the trade and economic development of less-developed countries.”). 
26 See e.g. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Gene-
va, Switz., Mar. 23-Jun. 16, 1964: Final Act and Report, U.N. Doc. 
E/CONF.46/141, Vol. I (1964) [hereinafter UNCTAD]; see generally Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, available at 
http://www.oecd.org. (China is not an OECD country); United Nations, Econ. 
& Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/1849/Add.1 (1950) [hereinafter ECOSOC]. (These 
entities have different legal basis, governance structures, funding, mandates 
and scopes.). 
27 See UNCTAD, supra note 26. 
28 See OECD, supra note 26. 
29 See ECOSOC, supra note 26. 
30 See, e.g., REVIEW OF MAR. TRANSPORT (SERIES) (2013), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Publications/Review-of-Maritime-Transport-
%28Series%29.aspx (UNCTAD has been publishing Maritime Transport Re-
view since 1968. The maritime related statistical data are also published in 
the OECD website). 
31Id.  
32Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6594 
(Dec. 17, 1966) [hereinafter UNCITRAL]; International Transport of Goods, 
UNCITRAL, (2013), 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods.html. 
7
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(IMO) 33 deal with various aspects of shipping, for example, 
seamen,34 the international sea cargo regime,35 and interna-
tional sale of goods.36 Amongst these specialized agencies, the 
Working Group III (on transport law) of UNCITRAL mainly 
works on the harmonization of the sea cargo regime37 with the 
assistance of a private international organization - the Com-
mittee Maritime International (CMI).38 
On the other hand, the WTO possesses two advantages 
over other forums on reinforcing harmonization of shipping re-
gimes. 39  This study focuses on the sea cargo regime and 
UNCITRAL, but the proposed way of cooperation in this paper 
might be extended to other respective shipping areas. First, the 
nature of legal documents administered by UNCITRAL and by 
the WTO is dramatically distinct. Most WTO agreements (in-
cluding the GATS and TRIPS) are multilateral and legally 
binding for all members,40 but the UNCITRAL-administrated 
conventions can be regarded as plurilateral agreements.41 Un-
like multilateral agreements, the category of plurilateral 
agreements is optionally applicable to UNCITRAL negotiating 
                                                            
33 Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Geneva, 
Switz., Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 (1948) [hereinafter IMO]. 
34 See id.  
35 See UNCITRAL, supra note 32; see Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5; see 
Hamburg Rules, supra note 8. 
36 See International Sale of Goods (CISG) & Related Transactions, 
UNCITRAL (2013), 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/sale_goods.html.   
37 See International Transport of Goods, supra note 32. 
38See CMI History, COMITÉ MARITIME INTERNATIONAL (2010), 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Home/0,271,1132,00.html (stating that CMI 
was established in 1897 before the UN); F.L. Wiswall, A Brief History, 
COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, http://www.comitemaritime.org/A-Brief-
History/0,27139,113932,00.html (2010) (The CMI drafted the Rotterdam 
Rules for the UNCITRAL Working Group III). 
39 This study focuses on the sea cargo regime and UNCITRAL, but the 
cooperation might be extended to other shipping areas. 
40 See John H. Jackson, The World trading system - Law and Policy of In-
ternational Economic Relations 47-48 (MIT, 1997).     
41Jerome H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual 
Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
23, 29 & n.39 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008) (dis-
cussing the difference between plurilateral and multilateral agreements. The 
term “plurilateral agreement” is used in the WTO. Unlike a multilateral 
agreement, a plurilateral agreement implies that WTO members would be 
given the choice to agree to new rules on a voluntary basis.).   
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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countries on a voluntary basis, and is only binding for those 
members who ratify the treaties.42 Moreover, UNCITRAL has 
also adopted additional legislative techniques in modernizing 
and harmonizing the law of international trade.43 Several dif-
ferent types of legislative texts are used on the basis of its 
mandate, including conventions, model laws, legislative guides 
and model provisions.44 Among these legislative texts, only the 
conventions are binding.45 As the maritime transport regimes, 
The Hague,46 Visby,47 Hamburg48 and Rotterdam Rules49 do not 
automatically apply to their negotiating countries, and their 
applications reply on ratifications.50  
In contrast, the second category of multilateral treaties 
consists of agreements that are compulsorily binding on all 
members, and WTO agreements mainly belong to this catego-
ry.51 Thus, a WTO-based maritime transport regime is legally 
binding and likely to be applicable to all WTO Members.52 Due 
                                                            
42 Id.;  see also United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (New York, 2008), 
UNCITRAL (2013), 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam
_status.html (displaying the status and numbers of ratifications of the Rot-
terdam Rules.). 
43 See U.N. Secretary-General, Question of Coordination: Direction of the 
Work of the Commission, ¶¶ 99-122, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/203 (May 13, 1981); 
see also U.N. Secretariat, Alternative Methods for the Final Adoption of Con-
ventions Emanating from the Work of the Commission, Note by the Secretar-
iat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/204 (May 21, 1981). 
44 See A Guide to UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL (2013), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-
UNCITRAL-e.pdf. 
45 Id. at 13. (“To become a party to a convention, States are required for-
mally to deposit a binding instrument of ratification or accession with the de-
positary (for conventions prepared by UNCITRAL, the Secretary - General of 
the United Nations)”). 
46 See MICHAEL F. STURLEY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CARRIAGE OF 
GOODS BY SEA ACT AND THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE HAGUE RULES 
(1990) (discussing the adoption of the Hague Rules). 
47 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Why The U.S. Did Not Ratify The Visby 
Amendments, 23 J. MAR. L. & COM. 29 (1992) (discussing the refusal of adop-
tion of the Visby Rules). 
48 See Hamburg Rules, supra note 8. 
49 See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5. 
50 See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5; see Hague Rules, supra note 6; see 
Visby Rules, supra note 7, See Hamburg Rules, supra note 8. 
51 Reichman, supra note 41, at 46. 
52 See Members and Observers, WTO (Apr. 26, 2015), 
9
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to all WTO Agreements being a single package,53 both substan-
tive norms within the GATS and its procedural enforcement 
system will apply to all Members. The nature of a WTO-
administrated maritime transport annex is if a uniform sea 
cargo regime is part of the annex, it is a multilateral agreement 
and is significantly different from The Hague, Visby, Hamburg, 
and Rotterdam Rules.54  
The WTO has built up the widest coverage of Members and 
application of scope.55 Governing over 161 Members, the WTO 
engages in over 90 percent of all international trade in goods 
and services.56 It is comprehensive in the composition of its 
membership, including all developed countries and almost all 
developing countries.57 There are few other legal frameworks 
that are better at promoting the multilateral negotiations on 
the trade of goods and related maritime transport services. The 
WTO framework covers the broadest spectrum of Members and 
almost all stages of development of economic entities from de-
veloped nations to less developed countries. 58  Therefore, a 
WTO-based maritime transport agreement will likely become 
binding for all WTO Members globally.59  
Due to its minimal political image, the WTO has earned 
great prestige over the developing world.60 In order to establish 
the WTO as a unified institution under the WTO Agreements, 
there were a variety of clearly unanswered issues after the con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations.61 These issues 
entailed further negotiations on services62 and greater integra-
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (Stating that 
there have been 161 WTO members). 
53 Jackson, supra note 40, at 47.                                                 
54 See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5; see Hague Rules, supra note 6; see 
Visby Rules, supra note 7; see Hamburg Rules, supra note 8. 
55 GATS - Fact and Fiction, WTO, at 2 (2001) 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsfacts1004_e.pdf. 
56 See Members and Observers, supra note 52. 
57 See id.  
58 See id. 
59 See JACKSON supra note 40; see Reichman supra note 41 (It is the na-
ture of multilateral agreements.) 
60 J. Michael Taylor, Evaluating the Continuing GATS Negotiations Con-
cerning International Maritime Transport Services, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 129, 
180-81 (2002).  
61 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 40 (1998). 
62 See id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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tion of developing countries,63 as well as monitoring of the 
WTO rules to ensure fair treatment of these countries64 the 
problem of integrating the “economies in transition” into the 
WTO system,65 and facing up to the problem of “state trading” 
entities.66  
B. Harmonization: WTO’s Liberalization and UN’s Unification 
Both the UN and the WTO aim at the harmonization of the 
maritime transport regime, but each does so with different fo-
cuses. The UN stresses the unification of the sea cargo re-
gime.67 As seen from the full name of the Hague Rules,68 the 
UN harmonization is targeted at establishing and updating 
universal rules for a wide range of countries. The WTO empha-
sizes Members’ deeper commitment in existing sectors to 
achieve further liberalization.69 Meanwhile, the WTO does not 
intervene in its Members’ regulatory autonomy over quality 
control of services supplied and the standardization of the ser-
vice regulation worldwide.70 Both the WTO and the UN try to 
adjust diverse levels of domestic regulations to universal levels 
set by them. The UN’s unification and the WTO’s harmoniza-
tion are both targeted towards global application and the level 
of standardization affects whether the scope of application 
could become global or not.71 Therefore, the harmonization of 
                                                            
63 See id. at 41. 
64See Who are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, WTO (2013), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm; see also Least-
developed Countries, WTO (2013), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (discussing 
developing countries and less developed countries in WTO; Contrasted with 
some other service sectors, the developed countries usually have less control 
on shipping sector than do the developed world.). 
65 See JACKSON, supra note 61 at 41.  
66 See id. 
67 From the full name of the Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules, which are 
negotiated under the UN. 
68 The “Hague Rules” stands for the “International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading”; see Hague 
Rules, supra note 6. 
69 See GATS supra note 17 pmbl. 
70 Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl and Pierre Sauvé, GATS and the Regula-
tion of International Trade in Services: World Trade Forum, at 3, 5-6, (2008). 
71 See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5; see Hague Rules, supra note 6; see 
Visby Rules, supra note 7; see Hamburg Rules, supra note 8 (showing the sta-
tus of the Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules, in comparison with the numbers of 
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the UN and of the WTO faces a question: which levels of the 
standardization should be imposed on the UN’s unification and 
the WTO’s liberalization? In general, the standard of unifica-
tion on limiting freedom of contract should be relatively low; in 
contrast, the standard of the WTO’s liberalization seems to be 
higher.72  
Nonetheless, the standardization is harmonized at differ-
ent levels under unification and liberalization. The level of uni-
fication of the different cargo regimes is balanced between low 
and high levels and regards the scope of application and liabil-
ity. Additionally, the level for liberalization sets the standard 
at a relatively high level requiring removing unnecessary regu-
lations, but the high standards are achievable through progres-
sive liberalization.73 Moreover, both targets of liberalization 
and unification can be achieved under the WTO framework. 
According to GATS Preamble, the WTO’s liberalization of ship-
ping markets can be achieved without prejudice to UN’s unifi-
cation of the sea cargo regime.74 In practice, TRIPS proves that 
the WTO is capable of unifying different domestic regulations 
and liberalizing markets in one go.  
III. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE WTO AND THE UN: FROM 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO TRANSPORTATION 
The WTO is setting a creative precedent to include IP re-
gimes into the world trading system through TRIPS.75 This 
precedent opens a door for individuals’ private rights to be 
merged into the WTO system. Taking into account the four as-
pects that IP shares with maritime transport, it is feasible to 
include maritime transport in the TRIPS’s counterpart GATS. 
First, TRIPS and the GATS are Annexes 1B and 1C at the 
same level of the pyramid of the WTO Agreements.76 Second, 
                                                                                                                                     
ratifications. It shows that the increasing number of articles tends to cause 
the deceasing number of ratifications.). 
72 Alberto Bercovitz, Copyright and Related Rights, in Intellectual Prop-
erty and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement 125-145 (Carlos M. Cor-
rea & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2nd ed. 2008). 
73 See GATS supra note 17, Part IV. 
74 See GATS supra note 17 pmbl. 
75 See WTO supra note 15. 
76 See WTO, supra note 15; see also WTO Legal Texts, infra note 82 
(showing the relationship of these Agreements in the chart on Annex 1B and 
Annex 1C). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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the implementation of TRIPS and the GATS are both safe-
guarded by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding at 
an international level.77 Third, both the IP and sea transport 
liability regimes are concerned with balancing rights and obli-
gations between private entities, such as rights holders and 
late comers in IP,78 and the hull and cargo interest individuals 
and companies in the sea transport.79 Fourth, both regimes 
came into being before the establishment of the UN,80 and 
there were respective international conventions prior to the UN 
conventions.81 Addressing the relationships between the pre-
UN conventions and the UN-administrated conventions under 
TRIPS was an unavoidable task for IP harmonization. Like-
wise, the GATS will provide a vehicle for harmonizing the mar-
itime transport regime, which entails addressing the relation-
ships between previous conventions, including the UN-
administrated conventions. On account of the four shared mer-
its of IP and maritime transport, five successful aspects of IP’s 
inclusion will be investigated in depth to shed light on mari-
time transport’s inclusion into the WTO/GATS.  
 
Figure 1: WTO Agreements 
                                                            
77 See WTO supra note 15, Annex 2. 
78 See generally Reichman, supra note 41. 
79 See Diamond, supra note 9 at 535.  
80 See generally UN at a Glance, UN, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/ (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2013) (stating that the UN was established in 1945). See in-
fra note 84 and note 85 (The IP conventions, such as the Paris Convention, 
were concluded in the 19th century); see supra note 6 and note 7 (The sea car-
go conventions were negotiated in the beginning of the 20th century). 
81 See e.g., Hague Rules, supra note 6.  
13
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*Figure drawn up by the author.  
 The Figure above illustrates the umbrella-shape of the 
WTO and the single-package concept.82 
A. Cooperation between the UN agencies and the WTO: WIPO 
and Council for TRIPS; UNCITRAL and Council for Trade in 
Services 
Patents and copyrights are two primary intellectual prop-
erty regimes.83 By the end of the nineteenth century the “Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property” (the Paris 
Convention)84 and the “Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literal and Artistic Works” (the Berne Convention)85 had been 
created to provide protection on the two categories of IP rights 
at the transnational level.86 Both treaties and their revisions 
are administered by a United Nations special agency – the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).87 Although 
revised, these pre-GATT conventions on IP rights did not de-
velop as quickly as did the advent of the digital age.88 The new 
circumstance89 entailed the emergence of an appropriate inter-
                                                            
82 See the full texts of the Uruguay Rounds Agreements in WTO official 
website, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm, accessed 18 
February 2013.  
83 Reichman, supra note 41, at 30, 44.  
84 See generally The Paris Convention on Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter the Paris Convention], 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html. 
85 See generally, Berne Convention on Literal and Artistic Works, Sep-
tember 9, 1896, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter the Berne Convention], availa-
ble at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
86 Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Pro-
visions, in INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND INT’L TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, 3, at 
5. (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2008). 
87 Id.; see generally WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (last 
visited February 8, 2013). 
88 See H. Kronstein & I. Till, A Reevaluation of the Int’l Patent Conven-
tion,12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765, 768 (1947) (citing the letter of invitation 
to the First International Congress for Consideration of Patent Protection 
held in Vienna in 1872, which stated, “We live no longer in the day of Indus-
trial action . . . We lived at a time . . . today a magnitude a generation ago one 
could not have imagined. Under such altered relations the Patent granted for 
an invention . . . becomes in fact a restriction unprofitable and obstructive . . . 
Such and similar inconveniences can only be met by the common action of all 
civilized Stated, disposed to the maintenance of Patent protection”); see gen-
erally Yusuf, supra note 86, at 7-8. 
89 As to intellectual property at the digital age, the new circumstances re-
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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national instrument that satisfied the technology creators.90  
Although the discrepancies between the developed and de-
veloping world on IP rights-protection were aggravated,91 it 
was increasingly recognized as the justification for harmoniz-
ing the conflicts of international rules.92 Even though the Unit-
ed States (US) and the European Community (EC) proposed a 
draft agreement on measures to discourage the importation of 
counterfeit goods before the world trading system,93 the pro-
posal had not been adopted at the Tokyo Round;94 however, the 
proposal triggered discussions for the adoption of TRIPS in the 
world trading system through the early 1980’s and the Uru-
guay Round.95 As a result, the WTO became another institu-
tion, besides the WIPO, administrating the IP regime under 
TRIPS. Thus, subsectors of the IP regime, including the pa-
tents, copyrights and respective IP rights, have been integrated 
into TRIPS since the Uruguay Round. 
In light of the WIPO-and-TRIPS case, this proves that an 
area that is traditionally administrated by the UN can be ad-
justed by the WTO system. It also proves that the WTO can col-
laboratively cope with pre-existing conventions, including the 
UN-administrated conventions. A WTO-based maritime 
transport regime can coexist with pre-UN treaties and deal 
with the harmonization of respective treaties together with the 
UN approach. The area of IP rights was traditionally adminis-
trated solely by the WIPO and maritime transport before the 
Uruguay Round negotiations was also administrated only by 
the UN agencies. Nevertheless, TRIPS has added some more 
ingredients to the IP negotiation forum and enforcement at the 
WTO under the Council of TRIPS, which justifies considering 
                                                                                                                                     
fer to novel technologies and inventions. 
90 Yusuf, supra note 86, at 6-7.   
91 See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Prop. in Int’l Trade: 
Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J OF TRANSNAT’L L. 
747, 795-96 (1989); see also Yusuf, supra note 86, at 8. 
92 See generally Kronstein & Till, supra note 88, at 768; Yusuf, supra note 
86, at 7-8. 
93 Yusuf, id., at 7. 
94 See GATT Secretariat, Work Undertaken in GATT Concerning Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counter-
feit Goods, MTN.GNG/NG/11/W/4 (May 6, 1987), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92020093.pdf. 
95 Yusuf, supra note 86, at 7.   
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the possibility of maritime transport being governed by both 
systems. In addition, a GATS-based maritime transport annex 
will make the regime apply to all WTO members, which will 
make the maritime regime applicable worldwide as an IP re-
gime under TRIPS.  
B. The Conversion of UN-administrated Treaties into the WTO 
Agreements through Selective References: TRIPS and the GATS 
The TRIPS Agreement permits the enforcement of existing 
instruments on IP rights, as long as such instruments were not 
a restriction on international trade in disguise.96 The TRIPS 
approach is permissive but cautious towards IP regulatory 
measures hindering free trade and competition.97 Thus, appro-
priate levels of regulation for example, the carrier’s liability 
under the UN treaties98 may be integrated into the GATS and 
applicable at the worldwide level as long as they contain no 
hindrance on liberalization and competition.  
IP and sea transport conventions came into being before 
the establishment of the UN and the world trading system.99 
Under the TRIPS Agreement100 and some pre-GATT,101 exist-
                                                            
96 See GATT, supra note 2 at Art. XX(d) (explaining, “General Exceptions” 
stipulates “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a dis-
guised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: […] (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including 
those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopoly operated 
under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, 
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices”); see 
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 8. 
97 See Reichman, supra note 91, at 795-96 (noting, an paradox of the 
GATT approach on regulations and free markets that the industrialized 
countries with free domestic markets hoped to impose a highly regulated 
market on intellectual goods on the rest of the world, and the developing 
countries with restrictive free market preferred a totally unregulated inter-
national intellectual property regime); see Yusuf, supra note 86, at  8. 
98 See, e.g., Hamburg Rules, supra note 8, at arts. 5, 6, and 8; Rotterdam 
Rules, supra note 5 arts. 17, 24, 59, 60 & 61. 
99 See generally Hague Rules, supra note 6; Visby Rules, supra note 7. 
100 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15. 
101 The GATT system was founded in 1947 and replaced by the WTO in 
1995 after the Uruguay Round negotiations; see The GATT Years, supra note 
2. 
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ing IP conventions are creatively incorporated into the WTO 
framework by selective reference.102 These previous interna-
tional regimes embrace the Paris Convention (1967 rever-
sion),103 Berne Convention (1971 reversion),104 the “Washington 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Cir-
cuits” (IPIC),105 and the “Rome Convention for International 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Pho-
nograms and Broadcasting Organizations” (Rome Conven-
tion).106 However, a number of pre-existing IP conventions have 
not been incorporated into TRIPS. For instance the “Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants” 
(UPOV),107 and WIPO “Copyright Treaty” (WCT),108 the WIPO 
                                                            
102 See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 2, 9 & 35 (stat-
ing, “1. In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, Members shall 
comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris Convention (1967). 2. Nothing 
in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations 
that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne 
Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in 
Respect of Integrated Circuits”. TRIPS Agreement Article 9, “Relation to the 
Berne Convention,” reads as, “1. Members shall comply with Articles 1 
through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. How-
ever, Members shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in 
respect of the rights conferred under Article 6 of that Convention or of the 
rights derived there from. 2. Copyright protection shall extend to expressions 
and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts 
as such.”; TRIPS Agreement Article 35, “Relation to the IPIC Treaty,” reads 
as, “Members agree to provide protection to the layout-designs (topographies) 
of integrated circuits (referred to in this Agreement as “layout-designs”) in 
accordance with Articles 2 through 7 (other than paragraph 3 of Article 6), 
Article 12 and paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Treaty on Intellectual Proper-
ty in Respect of Integrated Circuits and, in addition, to comply with the fol-
lowing provisions.”). 
103 Paris Convention, supra note 84 (Its latest revision is under the WIPO 
administration but not WTO/TRIPS.). 
104 Berne Convention, supra note 85. (Its latest revision is under the 
WIPO administration but not WTO/TRIPS.). 
105 See Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, 
May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477 (1989), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/washington/pdf/trtdocs_w
o011.pdf. 
106 See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Pro-
ducers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 
U.N.T.S 44 (1961), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/trtdocs_wo024.html. 
107 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 109, revised by 33 U.S.T. 
2703 (1978), revised by 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (1991) [hereinafter UPOV].   
108 See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 
17
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“Performances and Phonograms Treaty” (WPPT).109 In addi-
tion, only some articles of these aforementioned conventions 
and only some of these specific revised versions and not the 
latest revision, are incorporated into the WTO/TRIPS.110 It is 
not unusual for treaties of a technical character to be amended 
or revised often. But, the Paris and Berne Conventions have 
been revised several times.111 TRIPS, however, does not refer to 
the latest version, but to a specific revision of them.112  
The “selective referencing approach” has a backwards look-
ing, threefold merits: a selective revised version, selected pre-
decessor conventions, and selective articles within such a con-
vention. 113  In this way, parts of a number of earlier IP 
conventions, for example the Paris Convention (1967 version) 
and Berne Convention (1971 version), are made applicable 
through TRIPS to WTO Members, which might not adopt these 
conventions.114 Due to the broad coverage of the WTO member-
ship,115 TRIPS indirectly extends the applicable coverage of 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html. 
109See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Dec. 20, 
1996, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html. 
110 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 3.1, & 4(b). National treatment and the 
most-favoured-nation clauses apply only to those rights under the Rome Con-
ventions that the TRIPS Agreement selectively provides, but not to rights 
generally flowing from that Convention. 
111See Revisions and Contacting countries of Paris Convention and Berne 
Convention, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html. 
112 See TRIPS Agreement, arts. 2, 9 and 35.  
113 Cf Jerome H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the Gap in the TRIPS 
Agreement: Why Software Fared Badly, and What Are the Solutions, 17 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 763, 765 (1995) (arguing both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the TRIPS Agreement stem from its essentially backwards-
looking character: on one hand, the TRIPS traced back to the earlier conven-
tions; on the other hand, it also leaves gaps and loopholes, especially in non-
traditional objects of intellectual goods, such as computer programs and bio-
technology). See also Reichman, supra note 41, at 43 (discussing the short-
comings of backwards looking character on computer programs and electronic 
information tools in information age).   
114 Yusuf, supra note 86, at 20-21 (analysing the relationship between 
TRIPs and the Intellectual Property Conventions on the basis of these two 
articles, and he argues the twofold aims of the articles are first to incorpo-
rates the pre-existing conventions into the TRIPs Agreement and to express 
the intention of the WTO parties to TRIPS Agreement to maintain in force 
the obligations which member parties to related earlier conventions may 
have to each other under the provisions of these conventions).   
115 There have been 161 WTO members by 26 April 2015; see WTO Mem-
bership, WTO, 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
2. LIJUN ZHAO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/15  10:31 PM 
78 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::1 
these pre-GATT IP conventions.116 
The selective referencing approach helps TRIPS avoid po-
tential conflicts with former international treaties and with the 
UN to a large extent. TRIPS expresses an intention to main-
tain in force the obligations that WTO Members already have 
under the earlier conventions.117 Such a clear declaration is 
important in successive treaties governing the same subject 
matter, especially in the case that any two treaties are binding 
upon a different group of parties.118 This intention is to main-
tain the obligations already in force and to avoid the conflicting 
obligations for a WTO member, which already ratifies a pre-
exiting convention.119 Therefore, a Member to an earlier treaty 
and another Member that had contracted to both the treaty 
and TRIPS are subject to all the provisions of the treaty.  
Concerning shipping regimes, the selective referencing ap-
proach will reduce conflict with the Members of earlier treaties 
and make a respective regime under the GATS feasible. There 
are two important effective conventions with respect to sea-
borne cargo carriage: The Hague and Visby Rules. These were 
drafted before the 1970s,120 but they must be updated to keep 
up with technological changes after their conclusion.121 Con-
tainers had been used in shipping by the end of the late 
1950s,122 and they become widely used in the 1970s.123 The sig-
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, (last visited 
May 5, 2015). 
116 TRIPS, as a multilateral agreement, make the referred conventions 
become part of the TRIPS Agreement itself and be applicable to all 161 WTO 
members. However, the number of countries, which ratified such a conven-
tion, is less than 161; see WIPO, supra note 111.   
117 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 2.2 and 70. Article 2 entitled “Intellectual 
Property Conventions” states “2. Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement 
shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each oth-
er under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention 
and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.” 
Article 70.1 provides “This [TRIPS] Agreement does not give rise to obliga-
tions in respect of acts which occurred before the date of application of the 
Agreement for the Member in question.” 
118 Yusuf, supra note 86, at 21.  
119 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 2.2. 
120 See generally Hague Rules, supra note 6; Visby Rules, supra note 7. 
121 Edward Schmeltzer & Robert A. Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the 
Container Revolution, 1 J. MAR. L. & COM. 203, 210-11 (1970). 
122 José Angelo Estrella Faria, Uniform Law for International Transport 
at UNCITRAL: New Times, New Players, and New Rules, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
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nificant step toward modernized shipping was achieved by the 
emergence of the container.124 However, these new situations 
have not been embodied in the Hague and Visby Rules.125 Even 
though the UN has tried to update sea transport regimes with 
this trend through the Hamburg Rules and Rotterdam Rules 
since the 1970s,126 these Rules have not been as widely adopted 
as their predecessors.127 Even though they have been updat-
ed,128 the Rotterdam Rules do not allow contracting countries 
to opt out of any chapter, which increases the difficulty in 
achieving wide spread adoption.129 A possible way to make the 
best use of previous negotiations is to refer to Articles of these 
Conventions, no matter whether they are applicable or not to a 
WTO contracting Member, under a GATS annex, corresponding 
to the TRIPS precedent. 
C. Theory of Balancing Rights: Intellectual Property and 
Maritime Transport  
TRIPS negotiations have spawned a theory of balance, due 
to serving as a platform for bargaining and trade-off practice.130 
This theory will be enlightening for sea transport regimes, be-
cause both IP and sea cargo transport regimes face the same 
situation of conflicts between interest groups and respective 
                                                                                                                                     
277, 290 (2009); Arthur Donovan, Intermodal Transportation in Historical 
Perspective, 27 TRANSP. LJ. 317, 318 (2000). 
123 Donovan, supra note 122. 
124 Gelina Harlaftis & Ioannis Theotokas, Maritime Business During the 
Twentieth Century: Continuity and Change, in THE HANDBOOK OF MARITIME 
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 3, 7 (Costas Th. Grammenos ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
125 See e.g. Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 121, at 223-25; Estrella Faria, 
supra note 122, at 292. 
126 See generally Hamburg Rules, supra note 8; Rotterdam Rules, supra 
note 5. 
127 See MICHAEL F. STURLEY, TOMOTAKA FUJITA, & GERTJAN VAN DER ZIEL, 
THE ROTTERDAM RULES: THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF GOODS WHOLLY OR PARTLY BY SEA 125 (2010). 
128 Id.  
129 Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5, art. 90 (stating that no reservations to 
the Convention are permitted). 
130 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 7 (stipulating, “The protec-
tion and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technologi-
cal knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and 
to a balance of rights and obligations.”); see also Reichman, supra note 41, at 
33-36, 60-62, 152, 171, 187, 421. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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countries,131 and both try to harmonize the conflicts through 
treaties.132 As to the TRIPS precedent, the WTO balanced the 
interests between the IP rights holders and consumers,133 and 
as between the developed world and latecomers of developing 
countries.134 Likewise, a sea transport regime needs to achieve 
a balance between exempt rights holders (carriers)135 and con-
sumers (the cargo interests),136 and between the traditional 
maritime powers from the developed world and latecomers to 
international trade (i.e. developing countries).137 While devel-
oped countries were pursuing a high level of protection on their 
interests at the worldwide level, with numerous liability ex-
emptions, an opposite trend was taking place in the developing 
world.138 In the context of pre-1970s patent and copyright pro-
tections, developed countries sought to protect IP rights at high 
standards.139 The United States started using the US Tariff 
Act140 to combat the infringement of United States patents by 
foreign enterprises at the domestic level.141 It also introduced, 
together with the EU, a draft agreement on measures discour-
aging the importation of counterfeit goods into the Tokyo 
                                                            
131 TRIPS balanced between IP rights holds from developed countries and 
consumers from developing countries. The sea cargo transport regime deals 
with the carriers from traditional shipping powers from Europe, e.g. Great 
Britain, Greece, and Norway, and cargo export country outside Europe, such 
as China. 
132 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 7. The Rotterdam Rules state in 
Preamble that “Reaffirming their belief that international trade on the basis 
of equality and mutual benefit is an important element . . ., Convinced that 
the progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law . . . 
significantly contributes to universal economic cooperation among all States 
on a basis of equality, equity and common interest, and to the well-being of 
all peoples . . . ”.  
133 Id.  
134 Id. Reichman, supra note 41, at 33-36, 60-62, 152, 171, 187, 421. 
135 Faria, supra note 122 (e.g., European shipping powers). 
136 Id. Review of Maritime Transport, supra note 30, at 70. There are a 
number of newly emerged shipping and cargo export countries, such as Chi-
na, Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia.  
137 Id.  
138 Reichman, supra note 41, at 24-25. 
139 Yusuf, supra note 86, at 6.  
140 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004).  
141 Yusuf, supra note 86, at 7. See also S. Sell, Intellectual Property Pro-
tection and Antitrust in Developing World: Crisis, Coercion and Choice, 49 
INT’L ORG. 315, 315-49 (1995). 
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Round of multilateral negotiations.142 Conversely, developing 
countries sought to obtain the allowance of parallel imports, a 
greater scope for compulsory licensing, and less restrictive cop-
yright protection143 in order to benefit local social welfare and 
knowledge distribution.144 
In the 1970s, developing countries tried to obtain more 
flexibility in the IP rights regime.145 For instance, the develop-
ing countries stimulated the revisions of the Paris Convention 
and the Berne Convention under the WIPO’s administration.146  
Although there were divergent expectations about levels of 
regulation, views began to converge during the WTO and 
TRIPS negotiations. The GATT connection to IP was insisted 
upon first by the developed countries, not because of a belief 
that the strengthening of IP rights protection would further 
liberalize international trade, but as a bargaining chip for the 
access of developing countries’ products to the markets of de-
veloped countries.147  
On the other hand, the developing countries themselves 
gradually perceived the GATT-based multilateral negotiations 
as a lesser evil than bilateral concessions, due to the fact that it 
led to trade-offs between the more greatly protected intellectual 
goods and market access of other goods from the developing 
world, such as agriculture, textiles and tropical products, to the 
industrial countries.148  
As a result, a group of fourteen developing countries sub-
mitted a detailed proposal on TRIPS, which consisted of their 
views on the content and level of the standards on IP protec-
                                                            
142 See Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Coun-
terfeit Goods, GATT Doc. L/4817 (July 31, 1979); Yusuf, supra note 86, at 7 
(noting that this proposed agreement on counterfeit goods had not been 
adopted by the Tokyo Rounds, but it triggered the discussions in the GATT 
through the earlier 1980s and until the Uruguay Round for the adoption of 
the TRIPS).  
143 Yusuf, supra note 86, at 5 (in the way of permit relatively speedy re-
printing and translation of books related to educational and scientific devel-
opment). 
144 Id. at 5.    
145 Id. at 4-6. Reichman, supra note 41, at 23.  
146 Id.     
147 Id. at 9; Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of 
Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. L/4817 (July 31, 1979).   
148 Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9; Reichman, supra note 41, at 25; David Har-
tridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues in 
GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 893, 895-96 (1989). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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tion. 149  The submission of this proposal heralded the ac-
ceptance of a GATT-based standard-setting approach in IP pro-
tection by the developing world.150 Thus, the WIPO adminis-
trates IP negotiations in a way that focuses on the countries’ 
arguments for or against the higher level of protection of IP 
rights. Unlike the UN’s WIPO approach, the trade-off bargain-
ing happened to the TRIPS-based multilateral negotiations 
within the overall WTO framework. Therefore, the WTO is ca-
pable of engaging both the developed and developing world, al-
lowing them to bargain with each other. 
Moreover, interest groups can have access to negotia-
tions151 and derive profits from harmonization of IP and of sea 
transport, respectively, within the WTO system.152 The access 
to negotiations is a way for developing countries to take part in 
the rule making process, while developed countries can derive 
profits from TRIPS. TRIPS successfully imposes levels of pro-
tection, through imposing minimum standards on patents, es-
pecially on the criteria of eligibility and duration.153 These pro-
tections have not been addressed under the Paris Convention. 
Meanwhile, developing countries can gain bargaining chips 
in the sector of goods, services and IP.154 For example, they 
                                                            
149 See Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Uruguay and Zimba-
bwe, Applicability of the Basic Principles of the GATT and of Relevant Inter-
national Intellectual Property Conventions, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 (May 14, 
1990); Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, WT/L/540 and 
Corr.1 (Sept. 1, 2003).  Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9.  
150 See e.g. Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9; Reichman, supra note 41, at 25.  
151 Henry Gao, Evaluating Alternative Approaches to GATS Negotiations: 
Sectoral, Formulae, and Others, in GATS AND THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 183 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl, & 
Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008). 
152 See IP, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: TRIPS 
AGREEMENT (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008). See 
Pierre Sauvé, Been There, Not Yet Done That: Lessons and Challenges in Ser-
vices Trade, in GATS AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
SERVICES 599, 603-607 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl, & Pierre Sauvé eds., 
2008).  
153 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 14, 27(1) and 28(1); Cf. Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5A, Mar. 20, 1883, 
as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
See Reichman, supra note 41, at 30-31, 48, 49 (discussing the elevation of 
Paris-Convention, Berne-Convention and Rome Convention standards to the 
TRIPS standard).  
154 BENJAMIN PARAMESWARAN, THE LIBERALIZATION OF MARITIME 
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used IP protection as a bargaining chip in exchange for better 
negotiating positions in other areas, such as trade in goods un-
der GATT155 or trade in services under the GATS. In this way, 
developed countries maintain certain high standards, but the 
developing countries successfully were also spared some limita-
tions, such as compulsory licensing, and parallel importing.156 
The incorporated Berne Convention (1971) and its appendix of 
preferential measures puts limits on the rights holders from 
the developed world by enabling nationals of the developing 
countries to secure non-exclusive compulsory licenses on favor-
able terms.157 It is a compromise and the limitation is also 
qualified. For example, TRIPS addresses the scope of copyright 
protection by echoing the Berne Convention (1971),158 confining 
the limitation or exceptions.159 
In light of TRIPS, the WTO provides a bigger negotiating 
forum with trade-off practices to foster harmonization on sea 
transport. TRIPS allows IP to be connected to other WTO cov-
ered areas of trade under the GATT or GATS such as, agricul-
ture, textiles and tropical products.160 Therefore, the negotia-
tions of a higher standard of IP protection supported by 
industrialized countries gave the developing countries bargain-
ing chips in such areas as agriculture, textiles, and tropical 
products.161 Similarly, the GATS provides maritime transport 
with a range of bargaining opportunities under other areas 
covered by the GATS, GATT and TRIPS between different in-
                                                                                                                                     
TRANSPORT SERVICES: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE WTO/GATS 
FRAMEWORK 252-53 (2004) (describing different bargaining chips available to 
developing countries under GATT, TRIPS and other service sectors under the 
GATS). 
155 GATT, supra note 2; see also WTO Legal Texts, supra note 82. 
156 Reichman, supra note 41, at 33-36 (discussing limits of the Patentee’s 
exclusive rights with specific analysis on compulsory licenses and public in-
terest exception). 
157 See Berne Convention, supra note 85, art. 21 and app. arts. I – VI; see 
Reichman, supra note 41, at 44.  
158 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 9.2. 
159 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 13; see Reichman, supra 
note 41, at 63 (analyzing the constraints of licensing which limit the develop-
ing countries). 
160 Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9; PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154 (describing 
the trade-off problem in maritime negotiations). 
161 PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154; see also Marrakesh Agreement, supra 
note 4; GATT, supra note 2. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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terest groups and respective countries.162  
Similar conflicting groups compete under TRIPS and in 
maritime transport negotiations.163 The majority of maritime 
powers are Western developed countries164 who have estab-
lished exempt rights for carriers through earlier treaties.165 In 
contrast, developing countries accommodate a great number of 
shippers and cargo interest groups, but they are latecomers to 
international trade and transport.166 As latecomers, the devel-
oping countries had to abide by previous sea transport conven-
tions167 and were unable to amend the established rules168 that 
were unfriendly to them.169 Facing these conflicts, the WTO 
enables the GATS to balance rights and interests between de-
veloped and developing worlds, between traditional shipping 
powers and new born hull-interest representative countries 
from the otherwise developed and developing world, and be-
tween the hull and the cargo interest groups.170 Therefore, if 
the WTO initiates special negotiations on maritime transport, 
the TRIPS balancing theory and trade-off practices may apply 
to shipping areas and promote its harmonization. 
D. Universal Regulation on Minimum Standards:  From IP 
Protection to the Levels of Carrier’s Liability 
The level of regulations, which are seen in the form of min-
imum standards,171 result from balancing rights through nego-
tiations.172 The absorption of pre-GATT IP regimes into the 
world trading system entails the introduction of universal min-
                                                            
162 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4; GATT, supra note 2. 
163 Reichman, supra note 41, at 23-78 (Conflicting groups in IP negotia-
tions); see also PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 185-312 (Conflicting 
groups in maritime transport negotiations). 
164 Faria, supra note 122, at 289.  
165 See the Hague Rules, supra note 6; see also the Visby Rules, supra 
note 7 (describing the protection on carriers in terms of exempt rights and 
limits of litigation on cargo damages). 
166 Faria, supra note 122, at 278-92. 
167 The Hague Rules, supra note 6; see also the Visby Rules, supra note 7. 
168 The Hamburg Rules, supra note 8 (These rules are not widely rati-
fied). 
169 Faria, supra note 122, at 278-92. 
170 See Panizzon, Pohl & Sauve, supra note 152.  
171 Reichman, supra note 41, at 23-78.  
172 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 7 & 21. 
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imum standards on IP protection into TRIPS.173 The levels are 
explored through balancing the relations between innovators 
and latecomers in an integrated world market.174 Based on the 
principles of national treatment 175  and the most-favoured-
nation provision,176 WTO Members must accord to the nation-
als of other Members. These international minimum standards 
of IP protection are comprised within the treatment provided 
for in TRIPS agreement.177 One component of these TRIPS na-
                                                            
173 For a detailed analysis on conditions nurturing the growth of univer-
sal legal standards, see generally Jonathan I. Charney, Universal Interna-
tional Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L., 529, 543-50 (1993) (emphasizing the important 
role of multilateral forums in the creation and shaping of contemporary in-
ternational law and the ability of these forums to move the solutions substan-
tially towards acquiring the status of international law); see also, Mohamed 
Omar Gad, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and Developing Country Interest, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND INT’L TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, 321, 321-83 
(Carlos M. Correa and Abdulqawi A. Yusuf , eds., 2nd ed., 2008).  
174 See supra Section on balancing theory; Reichman, supra note 41, at 
21; Andres Moncayo von Hase, The Application and Interpretation of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND INT’L TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT at 83-124 (Car-
los M. Correa and Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, eds, 2nd ed., 2008) (stating that the 
TRIPs regime is a treaty that establishes a public international law regime 
on the protection of private rights through the establishment of minimum 
standards and enforcement mechanisms).  
175 The WTO national-treatment obligation requires non-discrimination 
against foreign rights holders. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 3.1 
“National Treatment” (stating,  
“1. Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treat-
ment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with 
regard to the protection3 of intellectual property, subject to the excep-
tions already provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention (1967), the 
Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on Intel-
lectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. In respect of per-
formers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, this 
obligation only apply in respect of the rights provided under this 
Agreement. Any Member availing itself of the possibilities provided in 
Article 6 of the Berne Convention (1971) or paragraph 1(b) of Article 16 
of the Rome Convention shall make a notification as foreseen in those 
provisions to the Council for TRIPS”). 
176 The WTO Most-Favoured-Nation-Treatment obligation requires the 
equal treatment under the domestic laws; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
15, art. 4 “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” (providing “With regard to the 
protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or im-
munity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Mem-
bers. Exempted from this obligation is any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity accorded by a Member . . . .”). 
177 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1.3 and Part II (entitled Stand-
ards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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tional and equal treatments constitutes the selective parts of 
the Paris Convention (1967), Berne Conventions (1971) and of 
the IPIC Treaty.178 The other component consists of minimum 
standards that the TRIPS agreement creates irrespective of 
earlier instruments. Either way, the relevant standards are 
binding on all Members.179 
The developed countries achieved their goals180 in TRIPS 
to elevate and harmonize minimum standards in several areas 
that had been established previously.181 With regard to patent 
protection, the Paris Convention strengthened the IP protec-
tion (1967).182 A WTO member has to respect a previous con-
vention referred and abide by the universal minimum stand-
ards within the convention, even if it has not ratified the 
earlier convention.183 The only possibility for deviation from the 
universal standards of patent protection is that a WTO Mem-
ber is in a transition period, being either a developing country 
or a least-developed country.184 The notion of transition gains 
wider acceptance for the WTO particularly from the developing 
nations.185 Also, TRIPS augments the minimum standards of 
protection for other areas of IP, including the trademark and 
                                                                                                                                     
Rights); Reichman, supra note 41, at 26-30.  
178 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1.3 (providing “general provi-
sions and basic principles”). 
179 Id. art. 9.1 (describing standards and “relations to the Berne Conven-
tion”); Reichman, supra note 41, at 29, n.39 and 46 (distinguishing TRIPs as 
a multilateral trade agreement binding on all members from a plurilateral 
trade agreement, which is binding only for members which have accepted 
them). Most but not all the minimum standards, set out by the Paris Conven-
tion and the Berne Convention are made applicable to all WTO member 
countries because of the TRIPS reference, no matter whether the Member is 
contacted to those conventions or not). 
180 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 16 (explaining well-known 
trademarks) and 22-24 (showing geographical Indications). 
181 Id. arts. 2.2 and 70.  
182 Reichman, supra note 41, at 30, 43 (claiming that intellectual property 
protection is strengthened). 
183 See WTO Membership, supra note 115. (All WTO Members have to 
implement the TRIPS and GATS unless in transitional period); see also 
TRIPS Agreement supra note 15, arts. 65-67. (describing requirements of 
transitional periods). 
184 Reichman, supra note 41, at 31; see TRIPS Agreement supra note 15, 
arts. 65 & 66.  
185 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 65-67 (providing privileges for 
developed countries).  
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geographical indication of origin.186As to copyright protection 
under the Berne Convention, TRIPS incorporates most but not 
all of the minimum standards set out in this earlier conven-
tion,187 adding certain additional standards of its own188 and 
begins the task of harmonizing the protection of neighboring 
rights.189 Nonetheless, TRIPS qualified the scope of areas sub-
ject to minimum standards. For instance, TRIPS excludes the 
compulsory license provisions of the IPIC Treaty from the list 
of mandatory international minimum standards.190 
TRIPS practices regarding minimum standards shed light 
on the WTO efforts to establish minimum standards on 
transport services under GATS. Both IP and services are invis-
ible outputs, which are qualitatively different from physical 
goods.191  In order to ensure information symmetry on the qual-
ity of services, it is necessary to establish certain instruments 
through government actions.192 Especially in the case of liner 
shipping and engagements of small shippers, legal instruments 
on the levels of carriers’ minimum liability will protect the con-
sumers from relatively bigger carriers’ abuse of standard con-
tracts and immunity clauses.193 Within the WTO system, the 
maritime transport as a service sector falls within the scope of 
the GATS, which is a parallel counterpart of GATT and 
TRIPS.194  
                                                            
186 Reichman, supra note 41, at 41-44.  
187 Id.  
188 Correa & Yusuf, supra note 152, at 125-382 (discussing new standards 
for IP protection in TRIPS). 
189 Reichman, supra note 41, at 45. 
190 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 35-38.  
191Michael Fritsch, Thomas Wein & Hans-Jürgen Ewers, 
MARKTVERSAGEN UND WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK: MIKROÖKONOMISCHE GRUNDLAGEN 
STAATLICHEN HANDELNS [MARKET FAILURE AND ECONOMIC POLICY: 
MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT ACTION, at 272-94 (4th ed. 
2001).  
192 Id.  
193 Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, Freedom of Contract, Contract 
Law and the Fully Specified Contract, in The Economic Analysis of Civil Law, 
at 273-295 (Edward Elgar ed., 2004), (arguing freedom of contract is “the ba-
sis upon which a properly functioning competitive economy that directs re-
sources to the highest value use is grounded”, but the market failure entails 
government action to restrict the abuse of this freedom. The bills of lading 
are the standard contracts of carriage of goods by sea that are widely used in 
liner shipping). 
194 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4; see generally Jackson, supra 
note 40; Reichman, supra note 41. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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Moreover, the WTO principles 195  do not conflict with 
TRIPS and the GATS creating minimum standards. The objec-
tive of the GATS is to liberalize trade-in services rather than to 
deregulate services. 196 The liberalization of markets entails the 
removal of the regulations that causes harm in such a free and 
competitive market.197 However, a service sector can benefit 
from certain regulations.198 GATS Article VI specifically pro-
vides qualification requirements and procedures, technical 
standards and licensing requirements recognizing “the right of 
Members to regulate and to introduce new regulations, on the 
supply of services within their territories in order to meet na-
tional policy objectives.”199 In fact, this Article does not set 
standards for a service sector, nor does it provide for the review 
of national standards. It instead aims to increase transparency, 
which means access to being informed of regulations, standards 
and procedures for licensing or obtaining qualifications. 200 
However, the GATS has not set any standard for service quali-
ty so far.201 Additionally, the GATS does not require a WTO 
Member to submit any national instruments for review by oth-
er Members.202 What the GATS requires is that its Member be 
able to demonstrate that a given measure is not more trade-
restrictive than necessary in the event of a dispute with anoth-
er Member.203 Therefore, the GATS may follow the TRIPS lev-
els of IP protection204 to establish levels for sea transport ser-
                                                            
195 Principles of the Trading System, WTO (2013) 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm. (These fun-
damental principles of the multilateral trading system of the WTOP are trade 
without discrimination, freer trade (gradually, through negotiations), pre-
dictability (through binding and transparency), promoting fair competition, 
and encouraging development end economic reforms). 
196 GATS - Fact and Fiction, supra note 55, at 11 (stating that many ser-
vices sectors are closely regulated for very good reasons). 
197 Principles of the Trading System, supra note 195 (describing free trade 
and promoting fair competition). 
198 Fritsch, Wein and Ewers, supra note 191. 
199 GATS, supra note 17, art. VI; see also GATS — Fact and Fiction, supra 
note 55, at 11. 
200 Id. 
201 Id.  
202 Id.  
203 Id.  
204 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 9-40 (Standards Concerning 
the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property Rights). 
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vices, for example, the level of carriers’ minimum liability. 205 
E. Enforcement and Dispute Settlement Mechanism: the TRIPS, 
GATS and DSU 
Traditionally, international trade rules are enforced under 
either decentralized or centralized paradigms.206 The pre-WTO 
IP regimes (the Berne Convention207 and Paris Convention208) 
seemed to take both approaches. They allow disputes to be 
brought before both national courts and the International 
Court of Justice.209 However, the disputes brought before the 
International Court of Justice are only theoretically possible.210 
Thus, the central approach to file cases before the World Court 
became a problem in practice. 211 There was no invoked litiga-
tion against the deviation from the agreed minimum stand-
ards, because it seemed like an unfriendly act.212  The sea 
transport regimes merely apply in a decentralized way in 
which contracting countries ratify a convention and incorporate 
it into national legal system.213  
                                                            
205 E.g. Rotterdam Rules art. 17 Basis of Liability [of the Carrier], art. 59 
Limits of Liability [of the Carrier], and art. 60 Period of Time for Suit. The 
GATS may selectively refer to part of the Rotterdam Rules, the Hague, Visby 
or Hamburg Rules, to impose minimum liability on the carrier so as to guar-
antee the minimum level of quality of transport services. 
206 Jonathan T. Fried, Two Paradigms for the Rule of International Trade 
Law, 20 CAN.U.S. L.J. 39 (1994) (contrasting centralized model of European 
Union which relay on supranational enforcement of European Court of Jus-
tice with the decentralized model of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment that depends on the judicial systems of Members); see also Jerome H. 
Reichman, supra note 41, at 63.  
207 Paris Convention, supra note 84, at art. 28 
208 Berne Convention, supra note 85, at art. 33 
209 These conventions allow the contracting countries to deal with dis-
putes at national judicial systems, and disputes can also be brought before 
the International Court of Justice. 
210 See Paris Convention, supra note 84 at article 28; Berne Convention, 
supra note 85, at art. 33. The International Court of Justice works as a world 
court, but it deals with relations between public rights instead of intellectual 
property rights and contract issues of maritime shipment; see also, Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Cases, http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/index.php, last 
accessed 19 February 2013. 
211 Gail E. Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue, 18 WORLD 
COMPETITION 137, 147-48 (1994); see also Jerome H. Reichman, supra note 41, 
at 64.  
212 Evans, supra note 211, at 147-48 
213 See status of the Hamburg Rules, supra note 8; Rotterdam Rules, su-
pra note 5. Thus, the sea cargo regimes are implemented through the ratifi-
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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In contrast, the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM)214 
guarantees WTO agreements to be effectively enforced at a 
central level.215 In this way, the TRIPS agreement fills the two 
gaps of pre-existing regimes and implements both approach-
es.216 TRIPS is guarded by the Council of TRIPS and centrally 
enforced under the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU),217 which was practically lacking under the UN WIPO 
forum.218 The enforcement of the TRIPS component of the WTO 
Agreement primarily depends on the Member’s domestic judi-
cial system, which must meet the minimum standards govern-
ing the substantive IP rights, such as patents and copy-
rights.219 Within TRIPS, Part III of the DSU provides detailed 
enforcement procedures, backed up by a centralized dispute 
settlement apparatus for all Members; thus agreed minimum 
standards within Part II of the DSU can be further maintained 
in the long run.220 In this sense, the TRIPS provisions on en-
forcement complement and reinforce the strengthened univer-
sal regulatory framework for international IP relations, which 
emerged during the Uruguay Round. Likewise, the Council for 
Trade in Services and DSM will safeguard a possible sea 
transport annex.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
cation of conventions, and then they are guarded by national judicial sys-
tems. 
214 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art.1, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401  [“hereinafter DSU”]. 
215  DSU, id, at  art. 1.2. 
216 See WTO, Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited 10 No-
vember 2013); see also Jonathan T. Fried, supra note 206, at 39; Jerome H. 
Reichman, supra note 41, at 63-64.  
217 DSU, supra note 214 at art. 1. On the one hand, the WTO Members 
incorporate the GATT, TRIPS, and GATS articles into their domestic laws; on 
the other hand, the disputes on the implementation of these WTO agree-
ments can be brought before the WTO dispute settlement bodies in accord-
ance with DSU. 
218 Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9.   
219 TRIPS Part II provides the substantive rights and minimum stand-
ards, and Part III prescribes the enforcement of the Part II. This set of provi-
sions deals with domestic procedures and remedies for the enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights; See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
216. 
220 Id. 
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IV. TRANSPORTATION AND THE WTO/GATS: LESSONS LEARNT 
FROM PROGRESSION AND REGRESSION 
The harmonization of liberalizing maritime transport ser-
vices and unifying maritime transport related regulations can 
be jointly negotiated under the WTO. To begin with, the WTO 
has successfully assumed the twin tasks under TRIPS. 221 
Moreover, the liberalization does not prevent the GATS from 
harmonizing the seaborne cargo regime of regulations. The 
past sea transport negotiations under the GATS mainly target-
ed harmonizing the levels of liberalization of shipping mar-
kets.222 The international regulations which are not competi-
tion distorting do not contradict liberalization.223  Thus, the 
GATS does not forbid harmonizing the different international 
regulations. Last but not least, the harmonizing of liberaliza-
tion and of sea cargo regime/regulation engaged the same nego-
tiating groups of countries (or territories).224 The tendency of 
liberalization in the international maritime transport area is 
also to produce a pattern of balancing and harmonizing coun-
tries with different transport interests. 225  Whilst developed 
countries with renowned merchant fleets were pursuing the 
high level of liberalization worldwide,226 an opposite trend took 
                                                            
221 See supra Sec. III (D). 
222 See GATS, supra note 17, at Preamble, ¶ 3-4 (providing “Desiring the 
early achievement of progressively higher levels of liberalization of trade in 
services through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed at 
promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis 
and at securing an overall balance of rights and obligations, while giving due 
respect to national policy objectives; Recognizing the right of Members to 
regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services within 
their territories in order to meet national policy objectives and, given asym-
metries existing with respect to the degree of development of services regula-
tions in different countries, the particular need of developing countries to ex-
ercise this right.”). 
223 Regina Asariotis, UNCITRAL (Draft) Convention on Contracts for the 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea: Mandatory Rules and Freedom of 
Contract, in COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN SHIPPING AND SHIPPING RELATED 
INDUSTRIES at 350–65 (Antonis Antapassis, Lia Athanassiou, & Erik Rosaeg 
eds., 2009). 
224 Council for Trade and Services, Maritime Transport Services: Back-
ground Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/315 (Jun. 7, 2010). The maritime coun-
tries or territories are divided into three categories: the hull dominated coun-
tries, the cargo-interest dominated countries, and the hybrid interests 
countries. A great number of countries belong to the third category. 
225 Id. at ¶27. 
226 Id. at ¶¶21-27. 
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place in the developing world with a prosperous export trade in 
goods but an infant shipping industry.227 Harmonization be-
comes more complex in comparison with other industries due to 
a distinct interest group of third-country transport.228 Hence, 
the WTO will be a feasible negotiating forum to further harmo-
nize liberalization and sea-cargo regulations. 
Sea transport has gained a prominent role in the WTO ne-
gotiating agenda under the GATS, along with IP under TRIPS, 
and maritime related service is an area on which WTO negotia-
tions were scheduled under the GATS.229 Since the Uruguay 
Round Negotiations, the international trade-in services have 
been included in the WTO negotiations along with IP.230 The 
relationship between sea transport and the WTO can be traced 
back from the Uruguay Round till the current Doha Round.231 
As Sturley commented, history is already repeating itself and 
there are lessons to be learnt from it; thus, many of today’s ar-
guments stem three decades or more. 232 The lessons to be 
learned from past maritime transport negotiations on liberali-
zation are not only enlightening for the WTO, but for as broad 
as all the treaties concerning maritime transport (including 
UN treaties), 233  because of same negotiating countries and 
same respective interest groups these countries represent. In 
light of progress and regress, experience in this part sheds light 
on the harmonizing of entire maritime transport treaties. 
                                                            
227 Id. 
228 Id. at ¶27 (discussing cargo geology and third-party shipments, viz. 
carriers are neither the producing nor recipient country).  
229 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meet-
ing of 4 June 1996, S/NGMTS/13, (Jun. 11, 1996), ¶2. 
230 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4. 
231 E.g. Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Maritime Transport 
Services- on 28 June 1996, S/L/24, (Jul.3, 1996), ¶1 (providing the suspension 
and resumption of the negotiations on maritime transport services); see infra 
Sec. III. 
232 Michael F. Sturley, The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules, 22 J. 
MAR. L. & COM., 1, 3 (1991). 
233 See, e.g., the Hague Rules, supra note 6; see also the Visby Rules, su-
pra note 7; see also the Hamburg Rules, supra note 8; see also the Rotterdam 
Rules in supra note 5. 
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A. Negotiations on Maritime Transport Service in the Uruguay 
Round Negotiations (1986-1994): the WTO, GATS and 
Maritime Transport Service 
Trade in services was one of the novel issues in comparison 
with trade in goods under the world trading system.234 The ser-
vice issues were introduced into the world trading system (now 
the WTO) by the United States over the strenuous objections 
from both the developing and developed world.235 Services sec-
tors were officially included in the multilateral negotiations of 
world trading system for the first time during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations.236 The negotiations on services237 were also 
separately structured from that on goods.238 This clear division 
highlights the importance of services and reduces the trade-offs 
risks between goods and services. It is worth noting that the 
negotiations on trade in services239 were accommodated in an 
independent multilateral discussion forum on the trade of 
goods.240  
The maritime transport negotiations need to address the 
trade-off problems amongst services sectors. In the Uruguay 
                                                            
234 GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT/1396, 
(25 September 1986) (clearly distinguishing the trade in goods and trade in 
services in its Part I and Part II). The intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 
and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) are also new issues besides 
the trade of goods under GATT.  
235 Raymond J. Krommenacker, Multilateral Services Negotiations, in THE 
NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, 455-73, at 456, (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Mein-
hard Hilf  eds., 1988). 
236 GATT, supra note 234. 
237 Id. Part II of the Ministerial Declaration on Uruguay Round of Sep-
tember 1986 as to negotiations on trade in services says, “Ministers also 
agree, as part of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, to launch negotiations on 
trade in services. Negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a multilat-
eral framework of principles and rules for trade in services, including elabo-
ration of possible disciplines for individual sectors, with a view to expansion 
of such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization 
and as a means of promoting economic growth of all trading partners and the 
development of developing counts. […] GATT procedures and practice shall 
apply to these negotiations.  
238 Id.  
239 Id. at 100 (stating in Part II that “[m]inisters, also decided, as part of 
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, to launch negotiations on trade in ser-
vices”). 
240 Id. at 101 (stating that “[A] Group on Negotiations on Services is es-
tablished to deal with these matters”). 
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Round, the shipping industry strongly resisted the world trad-
ing system covering transport services. 241  For instance, US 
shipping interests asserted that the inclusion of maritime 
transport services into the world trading system would be more 
harm than benefit. 242 In contrast, a majority of countries sup-
ported a broad coverage in the negotiations of services, includ-
ing maritime transport services. 243 Additionally, the exclusion 
of maritime transport would cause domino effects through ex-
cessive claims from an increasing number of sectors requesting 
exclusion from the coverage.244 The debate came to an end with 
the invention of a dual approach to maritime transport negotia-
tions.245  
The first progress in maritime transport negotiations is the 
introduction of the dual-approach. The dual approach was in-
troduced by a “Group for Negotiations on Services” (GNS) 
meeting in 1990.246 Under this approach, sea transport negotia-
tions were held at dual levels: being discussed in a general ne-
gotiation forum with all other service sectors at the one level, 
and a specific sectoral/sectional maritime transport negotiation 
forum at the other level.247  This approach had earned support 
                                                            
241 Uruguay Round - Group of Negotiations on Services, Report to the 
Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level, Montreal, De-
cember 1988, MTN.GNS/21, (Nov.25, 1988), (announcing the substantial ne-
gotiations were begun in December 1988). 
242 PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 252-53 (describing US domestic 
shipping industry’s resistance).  Cf. OECD, Doc. No. DSTI/SI/MTC(94)9 
(Mar.8, 1994), at 2-3 (claiming the gains might offset the lost).   
243 See Uruguay Round Negotiations- Trade Negotiations Committee, 
Mid-term Meeting, MTN.TNC/11, Part II, (Apr.21, 1989) (stating a majority 
of member parities supported a universal approach which kept any particular 
services sector from being excluded from GATS coverage). 
244 See OECD, supra note 242, at 2-3.    
245 On Sep.25,1990, Chairman Waldemar Hoffmann of the Working 
Group on Maritime Transport Services reported to a GNS meeting, which 
generally concluded that a special sectoral/sectional maritime transport an-
nex addressing this very special service sector was necessary, even though 
there had no consensus as to the exact contents of such an annex; see more in 
The Uruguay Round, Working Group on Maritime Transport Services, 
MTN.GNS/TRANS/6 (Nov. 30, 1990), at 1-2; WTO, Uruguay Round Doc. No. 
CC-TRAN2, Working Group on Maritime Transport Services-Reports of the 
Chairman, (Oct.19, 1990), at 1 (stating that there were different opinions on 
the very contents or formats of an annex on maritime transport regime). 
246 Id.  
247 GATT Secretariat, Multilateral Trade Negotiations the Uruguay 
Round - Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT) Negotiating Group on Dis-
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from many participating nations. 248 These countries agreed to 
follow the dual approach to accommodate the need of a particu-
lar annex on maritime transport regime, where a specific sector 
would be regulated under the world trading system.249 As a re-
sult of the dual approach, the maritime transport became one 
of exclusively negotiated sectors250 and an avid trade-off nego-
tiating problem. 251  Sea transport was negotiated under the 
transport-specific sectoral/sectional negotiations with air, road 
and inland waterways.252 The other specific sectors were finan-
cial services253 and telecommunications,254 which were also re-
lated to sea-borne cargo trade. Therefore, this dual approach 
has beneficiary effects of expanding the participation of mari-
time negotiations and shrinking the trade-off problem.  
Another progress is the supplementary mechanisms to 
solve disagreements. On the one hand, the bilateral negotiation 
was introduced to supplement the on-going of multilateral ne-
gotiations. Although the GNS tried to promote consensuses on 
a multilateral basis,255 the European Community and the Unit-
ed States had dramatic bilateral conflicts.256 As a result, the 
majority of the initial commitments submitted to the confer-
ence contained little or far from sufficient consideration of the 
interests of the maritime transport sector.257 Consequently, the 
                                                                                                                                     
pute Settlement, Meeting of 20 July 1989: MTN.GNG/NG13/15, (Jul.26, 1989). 
248 Uruguay Round MTN.GNS/TRANS/6, supra note 245. 
249 Id.    
250 Uruguay Round Negotiation, Trade in Transport Services- Note by the 
Secretariat, MTN.GNS/W/60, (Jul.4, 1989), (addressing air, maritime, multi-
modal and other transport services). 
251 See PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 254-56. 
252 Id.  
253 Uruguay Round Negotiation, Communication from the Chairman of 
the Group of Negotiations on Services to the Chairman of the Trade Negotia-
tions Committee, MTN.GNS/W/117, (Jun.26, 1991), at 5 (addressing the need 
of annexes on telecommunications and financial services). 
254 Id.    
255 Uruguay Round Negotiations, Report to the Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee Meeting at Ministerial Level, Montreal, December 1988, MTN.GNS/21, 
(Nov.25, 1988). 
256 For instance, the disagreement involved in the subsidiary system un-
der the auspices of the European Community Common Agricultural Policy 
related services. 
257 See e.g. Uruguay Round Negotiations, Conditional Offer of the United 
States of America Concerning Initial Commitments, MTN.TNC/W/112, 
(Nov.13, 1990); Conditional Offer of Japan Concerning Initial Commitments, 
MTN.GNS/W/113, (Nov.29, 1990); Conditional Offer of Australia Concerning 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
2. LIJUN ZHAO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/15  10:31 PM 
96 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::1 
multilateral negotiations broke down because of conflicts be-
tween the two gigantic economic entities.258 The multilateral 
negotiations on services were not officially resumed until the 
United States and the European Community had agreed to en-
ter into bilateral negotiations.259 On the other hand, a proce-
dural mechanism was designed to assist substantial negotia-
tions. For example, the GNS adopted “Procedural Guidelines” 
for substantial negotiations to solve the substantial disagree-
ments.260 Consequently, the results of the negotiations success-
fully covered twelve service sectors and their subsectors, in-
cluding transport service and its subsector maritime 
transport.261 It seems that a future agreement on maritime 
transport must be rooted in a consensus between the US and 
European countries. 
The additional advance made by the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations to maritime transport was the creation of a model 
scheduled approach.262 These modes were drawn up by the Eu-
ropean Community in an “Ideal Quad Schedule on Internation-
al Shipping”263 which was endorsed by three trade giants, the 
                                                                                                                                     
Initial Commitments, MTN.TNC/W/51, (Dec.4, 1990); Conditional Offer of 
Hong Kong Concerning Initial Commitments, MTN.TNC/W/54, (4 December 
1990). Cf. GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations MTN.TNC/W/35 (Nov.26, 1990); 
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 328, 364-65 (addressing the issues on 
GATS Annex on Maritime Transport Services). 
258 PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 211-12, 266-68 (describing devel-
opments of the multilateral negotiations as to service from mid-term review 
in Montreal in Dec. 1988 to the Ministerial-level Trade Negotiations Commit-
tee Meeting in Brussels in 1990).  
259 WTO, Press Release GW/11, at 10.  
260 Uruguay Round Negotiations, Communication from the Chairman of 
the Group of Negotiations on Services to the Chairman of the Trade Negotia-
tions Committee, MTN.GNS/W/117, (Jun.24,1991), (addressing the need of 
annexes on telecommunications and financial services), at 3, ¶ 4 (mentioning 
substantive and procedural guidelines); Uruguay Round Negotiations, Proce-
dural Guidelines for Negotiations on Initial Commitments, MTN.GNS/W/119, 
(Jul.2, 1991), ¶ 3.  
261 See Uruguay Round Negotiations, Communication from the Chairman 
of the Group of Negotiations on Services to the Chairman of the Trade of Ne-
gotiations Committee, MTN.GNS/W/117, (addressing the need of annexes on 
telecommunications and financial services), at 3. 
262  See GATS, supra note 17, at art. I.2 (prescribing that the four modes 
of maritime transport services according to the supply of a services).  
263 WTO, Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note of the 
Meeting of 5 May 1994, TS/NGMTS/1, (Jun.10, 1994), at 2 (mentioning EC’s 
draft schedule of late 1992). EC, Quad Ideal Draft Schedule on International 
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United States, Canada and Japan.264 According to the forms of 
supply, maritime transport services were divided into four 
modes: 265  Mode 1 cross-border supply (e.g. international 
freights and passengers shipping); 266  Mode 2 consumption 
abroad, (e.g. vessel repair); 267  Mode 3 overseas commercial 
presence;268 and Mode 4 the supply of transport related services 
through the presence of natural persons.269 The classification of 
modes makes the participants’ offers clearly comparable and 
saves negotiating time when there are disagreements on the 
levels of harmonization. 
Although the inclusion of maritime transport into the 
world trading system was agreed upon after the introduction of 
the dual-level approach, one area where there is a lack of pro-
gress is the Uruguay Round.  The draft “Annex on Maritime 
Transport Services” did not pass in order to become binding on 
Members.270 The difficulty in the passing of this maritime An-
nex was the bilateral disagreement between the United States 
and the European Community within the multilateral negotia-
tions. 271  For instance, they disagreed on the scope which ser-
vice sectors covered and whether special agreements should be 
presented in the form of annexes to a general agreement on 
services. 272  
Maritime transport services were covered by a draft annex, 
which included air, road and inland waterway transport.273 
                                                                                                                                     
Shipping, Inside US Trade, Jul.20, 1993, Special Report, at 2-4. 
264 Id.  
265  See GATS, supra note 17 at art. I.2 
266 See id., at art. I.2(a). (a) states “from the territory of one Member into 
the territory of any other Member.” This paper aims to unify the freight 
transport laws regarding Mode 1 in the context of overall harmonization of 
shipping regimes.  
267 GATS, supra note 17 at art. I.2(b). It states: “in the territory of one 
Member to the service consumer of any other Member”. 
268 GATS supra note 17 at art. I.2 (c) : “by a service supplier of one Mem-
ber, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member”. 
269 GATS, supra note 17 at art. I.2 (d) provides: “by a service supplier of 
one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territo-
ry of any other Member”, e.g. Maritime cargo handling, storage and ware-
house in ports, customs clearances, container station and depot; see also 
Parameswaran, supra notes 154, 306 footnotes 1437-40.  
270 Uruguay Round Negotiations, supra note 245.  
271 PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 214. 
272 Id.  
273 Uruguay Round Negotiations-Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft 
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However, maritime transport became the unique sector that 
was drafted in an annex but not adopted, due to the lack of the 
general admitted levels of harmonization in Members’ com-
mitments. 274 Nevertheless, the United States and the Europe-
an Community had not given up maritime transport negotia-
tions and agreed to settle their disputes by launching bilateral 
negotiations on controversial service sectors after the conclu-
sion of the Uruguay Round.275 In terms of the coverage of in-
corporated transport service, the European Community drafted 
a maritime sectoral/sectional annex applying to all interna-
tional maritime cargo transport services, including bulk cargo 
shipping and liner shipping.276 Their plan was too comprehen-
sive to gain general support at the beginning stages of negotia-
tions, 277  and the broad spectrum would possibly encounter 
more difficulties. 278  Therefore, the task of harmonization 
should be started from a small area, such as liner shipping.279 
The Final Act Embodying the Results of Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations was officially signed, and the 
GATS became an indispensable component of the WTO, in 
Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.280 The GATS disciplines general-
ly apply to all service sectors281 with various degrees of unifica-
                                                                                                                                     
Final Act Embodying the Result of Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations – Revision, MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1, (Dec.3, 1990), (drafting the an-
nexes on maritime inland waterway, road, air transport, financial services, 
telecommunications, and audio-visual services).  
274 WTO, GATS and its annex, supra note 15. As to financial services, a 
protocol (Second Protocol to the GATS) was adopted on 21 July 1995, and en-
tered into force on 1 September 1996. Subsequently another protocol (Fifth 
Protocol to the GATS) as to financial services was adopted on 14 November 
1997, and entered into force on 1 March 1999. Others protocols concerning 
the movement of nature persons (Third Protocol to the GATS) and as to tele-
communications (Fourth Protocol to the GATS) have also been adopted and 
entered into force. 
275 PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 214. 
276 See Uruguay Round Negotiations-Group of Negotiations on Services, 
Draft: General Agreement on Trade in Services, MTN.GNS/W/105, (Jun.18, 
1990), (a proposal from the European Community).  
277 Uruguay Round Negotiations, supra notes 260 and 261. 
278 Id. 
279 The consumers of liner shipping are not economic equals with the 
transport service provider, in order to protect them from abusing of liner car-
riers, it is necessary to establish international regulations. In bulk shipping 
sector, the problem is not as severe as liner shipping. 
280 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4.   
281 GATS supra note 17 at Preamble ¶ 3; GATS Article XIX (conveying 
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tion from sector to sector. 282  The inclusion of maritime 
transport services into the GATS is officially confirmed in the 
form of a GATS Annex entitled “Negotiations on Maritime 
Transport Services”.283 Therefore, further negotiations of har-
monization may be situated under the Annex. 
B. Progress in the NGMTS Negotiations (1994-1997): Bilateral 
or Multilateral? 
The maritime transport negotiations occurred in the era of 
specific sectoral/sectional negotiations after the Uruguay 
Round Negotiations. 284 According to Ministerial Decision on 
Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services 285  and GATS 
“Annex on Negotiation on Maritime Transport,”286 the WTO 
provided the mandate for specific sectoral/sectional negotia-
tions on maritime transport to be commenced no later thanMay 
16, 1994 and closed by June 1996.287  
The first advancement was that the design of dual-level 
negotiations which was maintained as a specific secotral dis-
cussion forum under the “Negotiating Group on Maritime 
Transport Services” (NGMTS).288 This group was established 
for the exclusive handling of the maritime transport regime.289 
Thus, the sectoral/sectional negotiations reduced the trade-off 
                                                                                                                                     
that successive rounds of multilateral negotiations in the GATT tradition as 
foreseen in the GATS will broaden and deepen in maritime transport ser-
vices).  
282 The application to a specific service sector was highly influenced by 
the related negotiations and the concrete commitments. For example, the ar-
ea of maritime transport services was suspended after the Uruguay Negotia-
tions until 1994. See WTO, Services: Post-Negotiations - Post-Uruguay Round 
Negotiation (1994-97), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_posturuguay_e.htm, ac-
cessed 3 July 2012. 
283 See GATS, supra note 17, at annexes. 
284 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4.  
285 Id. 
286 See GATS, supra note 17 at annexes. 
287 Id. at ¶ 4 states: “The NGMTS shall hold its first negotiating session 
no later than 16 May 1994. It shall conclude these negotiations and make a 
final report no later than June 1996. The final report of the NGMTS shall in-
clude a date for the implementation of results of these negotiations”.       
288 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Negotiations on 
Maritime Transport Services-Note by the Secretariat, TS/NGMTS/W/1, (2 May 
1994), at 1. 
289 Id. 
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risks between service sectors and reduced the opposition from 
the shipping industry. 
During the post-Uruguay Round Negotiations, the second 
advancement was that the NGMTS had integrated the UN 
agencies290 and elaborately worked together in depth for the 
first time.291 By the end of 1996, there were fifty-six mem-
bers,292 as well as sixteen observers,293 in the NGMTS negotia-
tions. These participants substantially engaged in the NGMTS 
negotiations through sixteen formal meetings at Marrakesh.294 
However, only international organizations obtained the right of 
observership. Some of the international organizations included 
were the OECD, UNCTAD and World Bank. 295 
 The third advancement is the method by which the 
NGMTS exclusively based substantial negotiations on primary 
data. The NGMTS had its Secretariat prepare a questionnaire 
to collect primary information in 1994.296 The finalized ques-
                                                            
290 See infra notes 291 and 292 for inter-government organizations, such 
as UNCTAD and the World Bank.  
291 See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 288; see also PARAMESWARAN, 
supra note 154, at 287-91. 
292 See Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note of the 
Meeting of 13 July 1994, S/NGMTS/2, (4 Aug., 1994), ¶ 1-3 (claiming that 
there had been forty seven participating members if counting the European 
Community countries separately by August 1994); Note of the Meeting of 9-10 
February, S/NGMTS/4, (9 Mar., 1995), at 1; Note of the Meeting of 17-19 July, 
S/NGMTS/6, (3 Aug., 1995), at 1; Note of the Meeting of 30 October-1 Novem-
ber 1995, S/NGMTS/7, (Nov.16, 1995), at 1. 
293Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Report of the Ne-
gotiating Group on Maritime Services, S/NGMTS/16 (3 July 1996), ¶3; WTO 
Doc. No. S/NGMTS/2 (4 Aug., 1994) (notifying that two intergovernmental 
organization -the UNCTAD and the OECD – become observers); Note of the 
Meeting of 17 October, S/NGMTS/3, (31 Oct., 1994), at 1 (announcing that the 
World Bank also became another observer, but the American Institute of 
Merchant Shipping did not). Cf. WTO Doc. No. S/NGMTS/2, (4 Aug., 1994), at 
1 (stating that the Council and European and Japanese Shipowners’ Associa-
tions applied to attend the meeting as an observer); Note on the Meeting of 9-
10 February 1995, S/NGMTS/4, (Mar. 9, 1995), at 1 (declining to grant ob-
server status to two private-sector organizations-the Council of European and 
Japanese National Shipowners Associations and the American Institute of 
Merchant Shipping- on the basis of an expressed preference on the part of 
several delegations for limiting observership to inter-governmental organiza-
tions). 
294 See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 288 at 1; see also 
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 287-91. 
295 Id.  
296 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Questionnaire on 
Maritime Transport Services S/NGMTS/W/2, (Oct.21, 1994), at 2-10 (publish-
41
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tionnaire was very comprehensive, consisting of two parts. 297 
The questionnaire covered matters beyond liberalization and 
regulation issues, such as the economic structure, including 
trade flows and regulatory structures applying to liner and 
tramp shipping.298 Part I of the questionnaire covered economic 
structure and statistics on international shipping markets.299 
Part II of the questionnaire dealt with the regulatory struc-
tures applicable for maritime transport in each Member.300 A 
wide range of participants committed themselves to respond-
ing.301 Almost all NGMTS members and observers responded to 
                                                                                                                                     
ing the schemes of the questionnaire and stating that the questionnaire 
serves the purpose of establishing factual background but not extends to is-
sues such as competition law and shipping conferences, as well on the institu-
tional arrangements). 
297 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meet-
ing of 4 August 1994, S/NGMTS/2 (Oct. 21, 1994) at ¶ 6; WTO, Questionnaire 
on Maritime Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/2 (Oct.21, 1994), at 3-10. 
298 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meet-
ing of 13 July 1994, S/NGMTS/2 (Aug.4, 1994) ¶11 (mentioning that the 
questionnaire would be produced by the Secretariat on the economic struc-
ture, including trade flows and on regulatory structures); S/NGMTS/W/2, 
(Oct.21, 1994), at 1 (stating that the questionnaire has been prepared for cir-
culation to all participants and observers of the NGMTS on Jul.13, 1994). 
299 See Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, supra note 296 at 2 
(stating in Introductory Comments, that the questions were designed to cap-
ture, as fully as possible, the information on participants’ market and regula-
tory structures applying to the maritime transport services sector, including 
both cargo and passenger transportation where relevant); WTO, Note of the 
Meeting of 17 October 1994, S/NGMTS/3, (Oct. 31, 1994), at 2, ¶ 6 (restating 
the purpose of the questionnaire is to establish factual background and did 
not imply a broadening of the scope of the negotiations). 
300  Id.  
301 See WTO – Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note 
on the Meeting of 13 July 1994, S/NGMTS/2, (Aug.4, 1994). WTO, Question-
naire and Response to the Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.-- (1994-1995) (covering 34 countries). WTO, Communica-
tion from Australia-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Ser-
vices, S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.4, (Feb.24, 1995), ¶ 8; WTO-NGMTS, Communica-
tion from the United States of America-Response to Questionnaire on 
Maritime Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.11, (Jan. 31, 1995), ¶¶ 3-4; 
WTO, Communication from the European Community and Their Member 
States-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.12, (Feb. 17, 1995), at 37, 43; WTO, Communication from 
Hong Kong-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.15f, (Feb. 10, 1995), at 4; WTO, NGMTS, Communication 
from Malaysia-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.19, (Mar. 13, 1995), ¶ 4; WTO, Communication from 
Ghana-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.21, (Apr. 3, 1995), ¶ 3; WTO, Communication from Ar-
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it,302 so that the information collected became comprehensive 
and worked as the factual background for the further negotia-
tions.303  
Additionally, progress has been achieved in two other are-
as as well. First, a majority of participants recognized the need 
to increase transparency on various domestic shipping regula-
tions and the value of legal certainty.304 Furthermore, the im-
portance of multimodal transport turned out to be further high-
lighted at the WTO. 305  For example, the United States 
delegation stressed the inclusion of the door-to-door supply of 
transport services within GATS framework in its informal 
statement on multimodal transport.306  
However, it is necessary to address the area of multimodal 
transport after the achievement in sea transport. As to inland 
transport by truck, members impose various domestic instru-
ments, which make the harmonization of multimodal transport 
very difficult.307  Subsequently, the joint negotiations on all 
transport modes would make the sea transport negotiations 
more difficult. Owing to the absence of joint negotiations on air, 
                                                                                                                                     
gentina-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.22, (Apr. 4, 1995), ¶ 2; WTO, Communication from Tur-
key-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.23, (Apr. 6, 1995), ¶ 5; WTO, Communication from Phil-
ippines - Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.24, (Apr. 5, 1995), ¶ 6.   
302 See generally WTO, infra note 394. 
303 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note of the Meet-
ing of 17-19 July 1995, Doc. No. S/NGMTS/6, (Aug. 3, 1995), ¶ 1 (encouraging 
every participant and observer alike to submit their replay in order for the 
Group to engage in a new phase of negotiations from as large an information 
base as possible). See also Council for Trade in Services, Maritime Transport 
Services, Doc. No. S/C/W/62 (Nov. 16, 1998), ¶¶ 1-2. 
304 These issues were initiated by a circulated EC Model Schedule, which 
was informally circulated among delegations shortly before the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round among the participants. See WTO, Note on the Meeting of 
6-7 April 1995, S/NGMTS/5, (Apr. 24, 1995), at 7; See also Negotiating Group 
on Maritime Transport Services, Note of the Meeting of 17-19 July 1995 Doc. 
No. S/NGMTS/6, (Aug. 3, 1995), ¶ 4; Negotiating Group on Maritime 
Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 13 and 16 February 1996, 
S/NGMTS/9, (Mar. 8, 1996), ¶ 5.  
305Cf. the Rotterdam Rules supra note 5 (reflecting the emphasis of mul-
timodal transport under the UN system). 
306 OECD, World Trade Organization - Recent Developments in NGMTS, 
DSTI/SI/MTC(96)8, (Mar. 7, 1996), at 3-4; see also Parameswaran, supra note 
154, at 343-46. 
307 See generally WTO, infra note 394.  
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sea and inland transport in the Uruguay Round and 
NGMTS,308 international multimodal transport arrangements 
should not be negotiated before addressing harmonization of 
sea and inland legs, as well as certain degrees of cabotage309 on 
inland waterways, respectively. 
Even so, negotiations encountered a tug of war, which sali-
ently happened between the United States and other partici-
pants.310 Also, a majority of participants had not rendered sub-
stantive offers for maritime transport.311 In particular, the US 
delegation failed to submit a timely and substantial offer.312 As 
a result, most other participants swiftly shifted backwards to 
their Uruguay-Round propositions.313 A number of negotiating 
representatives claimed that there was a need for a substantial 
offer from the world’s major trading entities first.314 Subse-
quently, their feedback was far from the United States’ expec-
tation on substantial rules on maritime transport under the 
GATS.315 It seemed as though many participants were waiting 
for the United States’ to submit their substantial offer first, but 
the U.S. was waiting for everyone else. Therefore, this histori-
cal period demonstrated the difficulty of addressing the tug of 
war in the multilateral negotiations.  
So far, accomplishing a multilateral agreement on mari-
time transport under GATS is still far from being attained.316 
The lack of a substantial US offer on maritime transport ser-
                                                            
308 Uruguay Round Negotiations, supra note 260 and note 261 (address-
ing air, maritime, multimodal and other transport services). 
309 See generally WTO, infra note 394 (referencing that cabotage is sub-
ject to national instruments instead of international instruments). 
310 Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Maritime Transport Ser-
vices: Adopted by Council for Trade in Services on 28 June 1996, S/L/24, (Jul. 
3, 1996) ¶¶ 23-30 (enclosing a list of documents of NGMTS negotiations on 
maritime transport); see PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 214. 
311 Id.  
312 OECD, Developments in Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport 
Services, DSTI/SI/MTC(95)34, (Oct.4, 1995), at 3-4 (stating that the US vio-
lated paragraph 7 of the 1994 Ministerial Decision on Maritime Transport 
Service in the form of domestic legislation to improve its negotiating position. 
The issue was argued at every the NGMTS meeting during Jul. 1995 to May 
1996.  
313 Council for Trade in Services, supra note 310, at ¶ 23. 
314 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meet-
ing of 13 and 16 February 1996, S/NGMTS/9, (Mar. 8, 1996), at 2.  
315 Council for Trade in Services, supra note 310, at ¶ 23. 
316 Id. 
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vices has tremendous negative effects in other countries, par-
ticularly in developing countries, on the inclusion of this sector 
into the world trading system.317 On the one hand, the Europe-
an Community proposed to promote a mere standstill agree-
ment, taking the view that “the challenge in maritime 
[transport service] was not so much to liberalize as to bind the 
existing openness of most trade regimes.”318 In contrast, the 
United States ardently appealed for an agreement, which in 
fact liberalized the shipping sector. 319  The United States 
claimed that an agreement standstill was not sufficient,320 and 
emphasized that a sea-transport agreement should be promot-
ing the level of liberalization rather than merely reflecting the 
current level.321 This was in spite of a last-minute unification 
effort by twenty-four participants322 that proposed a package of 
draft offers “conditional on a matching, comprehensive offer 
from the United States” in June 1996.323 The package consti-
tuted several substantial improvements on all three pillars of 
maritime transport services, as well as on multimodal 
transport. 324  Nevertheless, the United States ultimately 
deemed it as merely reinforcing the status quo and repackaging 
the previous offers that were far from being sufficient.325 When 
                                                            
317 See also, PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 343-46. 
318 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on Meeting 
of 8 May 1996, S/NGMTS/11 (May 14, 1996), at 2; see also Negotiating Group 
on Maritime Transport Services, Note on Meeting of 13 & 16 February 1996, 
S/NGMTS/9 (Mar. 8, 1996), ¶ 6. 
319 See also Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on 
Meeting of 13 & 16 February 1996, S/NGMTS/9 (Mar. 8, 1996), ¶ 5. 
320 Id.   
321 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on Meeting 
of 16 &19 March 1996, S/NGMTS/10 (Apr.11, 1996), ¶ 3. 
322 The European Community members count as one entity. 
323 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meet-
ing of 4 June 1996, S/NGMTS/13 (Jun. 11, 1996), ¶ 2. The participants in-
cluded Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, the European Com-
munity, the Dominican Republic, Hong Kong, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Repub-
lic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, South Africa and Switzerland. WTO, Doc. 
(unregistered): Conditional Aggregate Package of Offers on Maritime 
Transport Services, (Jun. 1996), at 1. 
324 Id.  
325 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meet-
ing of 13 and 16 February, S/NGMTS/9 (Mar. 8, 1996), at 1, ¶ 5 (stating that 
the US would not put forward either an offer or a request because it did not 
consider the existing offers satisfactory); See also WTO, Note on the Meeting 
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the NGMTS was ended mandatorily, the improved offer sub-
mitted by twenty-four countries was rejected because of the 
US’s resistance. 326 Consequently, it was widely recognized that 
the NGMTS negotiations should not be continued at that mo-
ment,327 and the NGMTS negotiations between 1994 and 1996 
fell into a stalemate at the end of June 1996.328 In order to ad-
dress the tug of war in future negotiations, bilateral negotia-
tions and multilateral negotiations might be undertaken.  
History usually repeats itself. When the Uruguay Round 
was nearing its end, some participating members tried to make 
a last-minute effort to achieve maritime transport liberaliza-
tion by offering varying degrees of liberalized offers,329but these 
                                                                                                                                     
of 17 June 1996, Doc. No. S/NGMTS/14 (Jun. 24, 1996), at 1; Negotiating 
Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 25 June 1996, 
S/NGMTS/15, (Jun. 27, 1996), at 1; Negotiating Group on Maritime 
Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 26 and 29 March 1996, 
S/NGMTS/10 (Apr. 11, 1996), at 1 (The United States stressed that the exist-
ing offers merely reflected the current situation rather than promoting the 
commitments). 
326 Id.   
327 Id.  
328 See WTO, Post-Uruguay Round Negotiations (1994-97) 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_posturuguay_e.htm,  (last 
visited Jul. 27, 2012). 
329 Participating members offered different degrees of liberalization on 
maritime transport, and a comprehensive substantive commitment on all pil-
lars of maritime transport and on multimodal transport were scarce. e.g. 
Uruguay Round, Australia-Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/6, 
(Apr. 15, 1994) (excluding the port service from the its negotiating schedule); 
Japan, Uruguay Round Doc. No. GATS/SC/46, (Apr. 15, 1994) (excluding the 
international shipping sector). Some countries offered rather protectionist 
commitments, e.g. Uruguay Round, Egypt-Schedule of Specific Commitments, 
GATS/SC/30, (Apr. 15, 1994); Uruguay Round Doc. No. GATS/EL/13 (Apr. 14, 
1994); Ghana, Uruguay Round Doc. No. GATS/SC/11 (Apr. 15, 1994), Uru-
guay Round Doc. No. GATS/SC/35 (Apr. 15, 1994) (stating protectionist com-
mitments on international shipping); WTO, Communication from the Euro-
pean Community and their Member States: Conditional Officer on Maritime 
Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/3, (Jun. 30, 1995), at 1, ¶¶ 2-3 (setting no 
limitation on the mode 1, e.g. international shipping, and freight forwarding 
services); See also WTO, Communication from Norway- Maritime Transport 
Services, S/L/33, (Sep. 12,  1996); WTO, Communication from Malaysia- Mar-
itime Transport Services, S/L/32 (Sep. 12, 1996); Brazil, Uruguay Round Doc 
No. GATS/EL/13 (Apr. 15, 1994). Cf. WTO, Communication from Iceland-
Conditional Offer on Maritime Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/27,  (Jun.24, 
1996)  (mentioning Iceland’s highly liberalized offer covering all three mari-
time pillars and multimodal transport); Korea-Schedule of Specific Commit-
ments (Apr. 15, 1994) and General Agreement on Trade in Services, Thai-
land-Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/85, (Apr. 15, 1994). 
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meaningful offers were withdrawn before the mandatory close 
of negotiations, due to the absence of a US offer.330 Other sig-
nificant maritime powers either entirely withdrew (e.g. the Eu-
ropean countries)331 or significantly diminished substantive of-
fers (e.g. Canada,332 Japan333 and India334). Again, the absence 
of a US substantial offer led the NGMTS negotiations between 
1994 and 1996 to a deadlock. Although the US delegation 
claimed that the US regime for maritime transport services 
was almost the most liberal in the world, many NGMTS partic-
ipants felt that there were some ulterior motives associated 
with the US reluctance to make a substantive concession on its 
domestic restrictive measures, for instance US unilateral cargo 
reservation for its domestic carriers and a conservative policy 
for its cabotage trade.335 As Parameswaran noted, the NGMTS 
seemed to encounter a tug-of-war between the United States 
and other participating negotiators:336 the United States was 
waiting for other negotiators to submit a set of comprehensive 
and adequate offers; nonetheless a considerable number of par-
ticipating countries would not actively and voluntarily do so 
unless the US handed in a substantial offer as a premise.337  
At first glance at the failures in negotiations, the history of 
NGMTS negotiations has established that it is difficult to 
                                                            
330 See, e.g., Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Commu-
nication from the European Community and their Member States, 
S/NGMTS/W/5 (Jul. 17, 1995), ¶ 3 (protesting the US unilateral measures af-
fecting the multilateral negotiations on the liberalization of maritime 
transport); Parameswaran, supra note 154, at 300. 
331 See Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, supra note 
330, ¶ 3. 
332  Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Communications 
from Canada: Conditional Offer on Maritime Transport, S/NGMTS/W/8, (Jul. 
18, 1995). 
333 WTO, Communications from Japan: Conditional Offer on Maritime 
Transport, S/NGMTS/W/5, (Jul.18, 1995). 
334 Id.; e.g., Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Commu-
nication from India: Conditional Offer on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/29 (Jul.8, 1996).     
335 PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 297-99 (illustrating the insuffi-
ciency of the maritime transport offers by shedding lights on developing 
countries of Asia and South America, such as India and Brazil). 
336 Id. Traditional European maritime powers concerned that inclusion of 
maritime transport into GATS framework would downgrade the degree of 
liberty of shipping industry. 
337 Id. at 299.  
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achieve a worldwide enforceable maritime transport regime 
without a meaningful participation from the United States. 
The previous negotiation practices teach us that a successful 
conclusion of an extended negotiation of Uruguay Round nego-
tiation on the GATS is not achievable without the participation 
of the US. As further maritime transport negotiations devel-
oped, it became obvious that a substantial involvement of the 
United States was the precondition for the breakdown of the 
paralyzed maritime negotiations.  
Further scrutiny of the United States’ practice shows a bi-
lateral approach may break the deadlock in multilateral nego-
tiations. First of all, the absence of a US substantial offer is be-
cause there are two conflicting voices as to shipping within this 
country. It is the United States government who pioneered the 
inclusion of services sectors into WTO;338 meanwhile its domes-
tic shipping industry tried to exclude shipping from being in-
cluded. 339 The shipping industry’s resistance originated from 
the shipowners who feared that their interests granted by na-
tional instruments would vanish after maritime transport ser-
vices were integrated at the world trading system. 340 Moreover, 
conflicts within influential parties had not been properly ad-
dressed before the multilateral negotiations at the WTO level. 
For instance, the confrontation between the United States and 
the Europe was once very tough.341 The success of the US-EC 
bilateral agreement proves that the tough issues can be ad-
dressed by moving from a bilateral approach to extended multi-
                                                            
338 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Trade in Services: Ex-
ports and Foreign Revenue - Special Report, OTA-ITE-316 (1986), at 7 (citing 
document prepared at the request of the US Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs as a “separate publication of OTA’s estimates of the impacts of 
services trade on the Nation’s balance of payments.”. By 1982, US policymak-
ers had decided “to place a high priority on services in the next round [of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations]. Later on, the US augmented international prep-
arations of the multilateral negotiations in service for the Uruguay Round). 
339 William DiBenedetto, Hills Asks Congress to Table GATT Maritime 
Resolutions, 4 J.L  COM., 3B (1989); see also PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, 
at 254. 
340 Id.  
341 See the US and EC’s disagreement on agriculture caused temporary 
suspension of GATS negotiations in PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 211-
12; 266-68 (describing developments of the multilateral negotiations as to 
service from mid-term review in Montreal in December 1988 to the Ministe-
rial-level Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting in Brussels in 1990 because 
of a compromise between the EC and the US); Uruguay Round Negotiations, 
MTN.GNS/W/60, supra note 250 at ¶49-94 on maritime transport.  
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lateral negotiations. 342 Further, in recent maritime negotia-
tions, bilateral agreements are highly helpful between im-
portant trade regions, such as those concluded between the Eu-
ropean Union and China, 343  and the United States and 
China.344  Therefore, bilateral negotiations will help the multi-
lateral trading negotiations remove difficulties. 
C. Regression in Doha Round Negotiations (2000): Trade-off 
Problem and the Necessity of an Annex 
On January 1, 2000, GATS negotiations were officially 
launched as scheduled.345 This new trade round was initiated 
at a Declaration during the Fourth WTO Ministerial Confer-
ence in Doha, Oatar in November 2001 (Doha Round).346 Cur-
rently, maritime transport services are included in this Round 
under GATS negotiations along with all other service sectors.347  
In an early phase of the Doha Round, the developed and 
the developing countries expressed their common interest in 
maritime transport services.348 In October 2000, the European 
Community prompted a joint statement specifically dealing 
                                                            
342 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meet-
ing of 6-7 April 1995, S/NGMTS/5, at 8, ¶ 36 (the Chairman of the NGMTS 
pointing out the process could be plurilateral, multilateral or bilateral in 
character to enhance greater transparency and legal certainty; Note on the 
Meeting of 30 October-1 November 1995, S/NGMTS/7, at 2, ¶. 8. The inclusion 
of GATS under the WTO framework started from the successful bilateral ne-
gotiations between the EC and US; See also, Note on the Meeting of 5 and 8 
December 1995, S/NGMTS/8, (Jan. 5, 1996), at 1-2, ¶ 6 (the Chairman of the 
NGMTS placed great emphasis on the need for the participants to intensify 
the bilateral negotiations accompanying the multilateral negotiations;, Note 
on the Meeting of 13 and 16 February 1996, S/NGMTS/9, (Mar. 8, 1996), at 
1,¶. 5 (considering the bilateral negotiations as useful and candid by the US 
delegation). 
343 Council for Trade In Services, Maritime Transport Services Back-
ground Note by Secretariat, S/C/W/315, (Jun.7, 2010) at 36, ¶126 . 
344 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meet-
ing of 26 and 29 March 1996, S/NGMTS/10, (Apr. 11, 1996), at 1 (mentioning 
the NGMTS negotiations that the combination of bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations). 
345  See GATS, supra note 17, at 19.  
346 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1 (2001). 
347 WTO, Service Negotiations, (Jul. 12, 2012), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm. 
348 WTO, infra notes 349 and 350. 
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with maritime transport.349 Later, Japan, Norway, the Repub-
lic of Korea, Chile, Australia and Colombia submitted respec-
tive negotiation proposals as well. 350 As we have seen, the Doha 
Round inherits a request-offer approach from previous negotia-
tions.351 In light of the previous offers, they aimed to reduce, or 
even to further eliminate, impediments to the shipping indus-
try and to cultivate a free and fair competitive shipping market 
with merely a minimum level of regulation on reducing ship-
ping tariffs thus benefiting consumers from all WTO member 
parties.352  
The principles of trade in services are contained in the 
GATS, including maritime transport service sectors. 353  The 
specific regime for maritime transport services in the negotia-
tions is defined by decision.354 The “Guidelines and Procedures 
for the Negotiations on Trade in Services” at paragraph 11 
claims that “Liberalization shall be advanced through bilateral, 
plurilateral or multilateral negotiations […]”.355 After the Hong 
Kong 2005 Ministerial Conference, the rigidness of harmoniza-
tion on maritime transport services is amended with certain 
flexibilities with regard to countries at different stage of devel-
                                                            
349 Council For Trade in Services, Joint Statement from the European 
Community and their Member States, Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Norway and Singapore: The Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/CSS/W/8, (Oct. 6, 2006),  ¶¶ 3-5, (announcing their ambition for real and 
meaningful liberalization in shipping).  
350 See Council For Trade in Services, Communication from the European 
Communities and Their Member States: GATS 2000: Transport Services, 
S/CSS/W/41, (Dec.22, 2000), at 8; Communication from Japan: The Negotia-
tions on Trade in Services, S/CSS/W/42, (Dec. 22, 2000), at 10-11; Communi-
cation from Norway: The Negotiations on Trade in Services, S/CSS/W/59, 
(Mar. 21, 2001), at 6; Communication from Republic of Korea: Negotiating 
Proposal for Maritime Transport Services, S/CSS/W/87, (May 11, 2001), at 1; 
Communication from Chile: The Negotiations on Trade in Services, 
S/CSS/W/88, (May 14, 2001), at 3; Communication from Australia: Negotiat-
ing Proposal for Maritime Transport Services, S/CSS/W/111, (Oct. 1, 2001), at 
1; Communication from Colombia - Negotiating Proposal for Maritime 
Transport Services, S/CSS/W/123, (Nov. 27, 2001), at 1. 
351 Uruguay Round and NGMTS Negotiations in Section IV.A-B; See, e.g., 
supra notes 323, 325, 330-33. 
352 Council for Trade in Services, supra notes 349-50. 
353 WTO, supra note 347. 
354 Council For Trade in Services, Decisions on Maritime Transport Ser-
vices, S/L/24, (Jul. 3, 1996). 
355 Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines and 
Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services, S/L/93, (Mar. 29, 2003). 
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
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opment.356  
A substantial advance in the Doha Round negotiations is 
that absence of a US offer on the maritime transport sector has 
not frozen the multilateral negotiations. Until 2003, the United 
States had not included any specific commitment on maritime 
transport service 357  because the inclusion of the maritime 
transport into GATS/WTO negotiations under the Doha Round 
would reduce US flexibility on whether to undertake counter-
act. 358 The inclusion means that the breach of WTO maritime 
transport will be a subject under the dispute settlement appa-
ratus, instead of by any unilateral retaliatory measure, in addi-
tion that the US would be subject to the WTO dispute settle-
ment system concerning maritime transport issues. 359 
Moreover, the US’s hesitation caused negative reactions from 
other countries, particularly developing countries, such as In-
dia and Brazil towards handing in any comprehensive and sub-
stantial offers in the sector.360 Even so, developing countries 
have learnt not to rely heavily on the US attitude. There are an 
increasing number of developing countries that have made 
substantial commitments on maritime transport, including In-
dia and Brazil. 361 As a result, the Doha Round has been devel-
oped without heavy reliance on the US offers like the NGMTS 
negotiations (1994-1996).  
Unlike the NGMTS specific forum, the Doha Round is 
problematic owing to lack of a specialized maritime transport 
negotiation platform. Although the Korean delegation hinted 
                                                            
356 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 
2005: Doha Work Programme, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, Annex C, at  C-2, ¶ 3, 5 (on 
the more forms of negotiations and more flexibility for less developed coun-
tries); see also Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl and Pierre Sauvé, supra note 70, 
at 153. 
357 Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication 
from the US: Initial Offer, TN/S/O/USA, (Apr.9, 2003), at 93. 
358 See PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 320-21, n.1508 (The Chairman 
of the US Federal Maritime Commission expressed concerns that “the Com-
mission’s authority to move unilaterally to counteract the laws and actions of 
foreign government is unique. […] this is an important authority and the 
Commission is judicious in its use. Had the US agreed to include maritime 
services in the World Trade Organization, the Commission would have lost 
this authority and not been able to take these actions”).  
359 DSU Article 2. 
360 WTO, Members and Observers, supra note 52. 
361  PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 339-41.  
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that it was necessary to found the NGMTS-like negotiation fo-
rum, a specialized negotiation forum on merely maritime 
transport has not been established.362 The General Council of 
Services decided to undertake maritime transport negotiations 
along with all other services sectors.363 Firstly, it is unlikely for 
negotiators to be equipped with adequate knowledge in this 
sector due to the perplexing nature of sea transport.  
Moreover, the mixed negotiations mean the sea transport 
sector encounters trade-off risks from other sectors. The cross 
sectoral/sectional trade-off bargaining practices existed in the 
previous WTO negotiations. This practice was widely manipu-
lated by negotiators in their bargaining procedure in the trans-
formation from the GATT system to the WTO system.364 From 
the perspective of a governmental negotiator, the overall ser-
vice trade of the country gained an upper hand over domestic 
shipping industry only.365 Due to the lesser economic and polit-
ical importance of the shipping industry compared with a coun-
try’s overall services economy, the maritime transport sector 
faced a challenge from the trade-off process.366 Despite the 
acknowledgement of the essential importance achieved through 
GATT as to trade of goods, shipowners’ associations in different 
countries might fear that the inclusion of maritime services ne-
gotiations in this framework is paralleled with all other sec-
toral/sectional services bears the risk of cross-sectoral/sectional 
trade-off problem.367 The problem will remain outstanding un-
less the maritime transport is negotiated separately as a specif-
ic service sector; the agreements achieved in the independent 
negotiations will form a GATS annex. 
Additionally, a request-offer approach used in the Doha 
                                                            
362 Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Korea Delega-
tion’s Proposal, S/CSS/W/87, (May 11, 2001), at ¶5.  
363 Id.   
364 See Jackson, supra note 40, at 48.  
365 PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 252-53, 346-48. 
366 Id.  
367 See CENSA, GATT Rules for Sea Transport: CENSA Position Paper 
(May 1984), at 2; BIAC, BIAC Statement to the OECD Maritime Transport 
Committee Regarding Maritime Services and the GATT (Jun.23, 1989; Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, Liberalization of Services Under the GATT 
Uruguay Round, 321/360 (1989), at 2; OECD DAFFE/MTC/87.11(2nd Rev.) 
(October 1987), at 7; OECD, Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations on Maritime Transport, DSTI/SI/MTC(94)9, (Mar.1994), 
at 2. 
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Round bears a risk of creating a negotiation vacuum in WTO 
Member’s offers. During 2003, WTO Members submitted a 
number of initial offers on all service sectors.368 Among them, 
some offers contained meaningfully substantial commitments 
on all three pillars of maritime transport, 369  multimodal 
transport (referred to sometimes as the fourth pillar), and even 
on certain extents of cabotage domestic transport.370 Take the 
European Community offer as an example. The European 
Community mainly restates its 1996 NGMTS-negotiation offer 
with a high extent of liberalization on international shipping 
and on cabotage shipping as well.371 So do the offers of New 
Zealand, 372  Australia, 373  Canada, 374  Japan, all of whom are 
maritime powers.375 Nevertheless, others omitted the shipping 
sector in their service GATS commitments entirely. A salient 
example was the US offer, which did not include any specific 
commitment to the shipping sector.376 
Last but not least, it is necessary to unify the system of 
classification before the next negotiations. The participants fol-
low various classifications of maritime transport sub-
categories, so that it is very difficult to precisely identify com-
mon and conflicting areas for further negotiations.377 So far, the 
diversity of national commitments combine three commonly 
used forms of classification systems, mixing the Central Prod-
uct Classification (CPC) system and services sectoral/sectional 
                                                            
368 See infra notes 360, 376 and 377. 
369 WTO, Notes to the Section on International Maritime Transport Ser-
vices, TN/S/O/EEC (Jun.10, 2003). 
370 Id.  
371 Id.  
372 Council for Trade in Services Special Session, New Zealand: Initial 
Conditioning Offer, TN/S/O/NZL (Mar. 31, 2003). 
373 Council for Trade in Services Special Session, Australia: Initial Condi-
tioning Offer, TN/S/O/AUS (Apr. 2, 2003). 
374 Council for Trade in Services Special Session, Canada: Initial Condi-
tioning Offer, TN/S/O/CAN (Apr. 4, 2003). 
375 Council for Trade in Services Special Session, Japan: Initial Condi-
tioning Offer, TN/S/O/JPN (Apr. 7, 2003). 
376 See Council for Trade in Services Special Session, United States: Ini-
tial Offer, TN/S/O/USA, (Apr. 9, 2003) at 93; Chile: Initial Offer, 
TN/S/O/CHL, (Jul. 16, 2003) at 35-36; Turkey: Initial Offer, TN/S/O/TUR, 
(Sep. 3, 2003) at 34-35. The US offer on maritime transport sector was ab-
sent. 
377 See Council for Trade in Services, Maritime Transport Services Back-
ground Note by Secretariat, S/C/W/315, (Jun. 7, 2010). 
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Classification List, as well as the Maritime Model Schedule 
(MMS). 378 The diversity is further perplexed by the fact that 
some Members added their own sui generis definitions.379 
As of November 2005, WTO members collectively identified 
their sectoral/sectional and modal objectives for maritime 
transport negotiations.380 Unfortunately, many of the details of 
maritime negotiations contained in maritime transport negoti-
ations remain restricted and unavailable for researchers.   
The key objective of this new round of maritime negotia-
tions probably puts greater emphasis on developing countries, 
which is reflected in many articles in the 2001 Doha Ministeri-
al Declaration.381 Active participation of China in the WTO ne-
gotiations and in the Rotterdam Rules’ negotiations offer vari-
ous chances for maritime transport service providers from all 
over the world to embody the Chinese maritime regime in a 
uniform regime under the WTO, in particular the GATS, 
framework.  
It is worth noting that, within the WTO framework, a mul-
tilateral trading and negotiating system, there are a few non-
reciprocal elements, albeit they usually erode the unification of 
an international transport regime. These exceptions originate 
from the progressive notion.382 According to some, these excep-
tions benefit less developed countries from a fully uniform 
GATS transport regime offered by developed member parities 
without requiring that the former groups adhere to the uniform 
standards at exactly the same degree as that of the later 
groups. In fact, it is reasonable to allow this non-reciprocity, 
because these LDCs are usually negotiating underdogs.383 Ow-
ing to their minor economic importance and unfamiliarity with 
the WTO rules of play, they cannot act as rule makers.384  
                                                            
378 Council for Trade in Services, Maritime Transport Services Back-
ground Notes by Secretariat, MTN/GNS/W/120, (Jun. 7, 2010). 
379 See Council for Trade in Services, supra note 378, at 36, ¶136. 
380 See WTO, 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/tn/s/23.doc, ac-
cessed Jan. 26, 2013. 
381 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001), at ¶¶ 2, 3, 9, 15 and 16. 
382 GATS, supra note 17, at  Part IV “Progressive Liberalization” 
383 PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 252-53, 346-48. 
384 See WTO, Less-Developed Countries, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm, accessed Sep. 30, 2013.   
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This merit distinguishes the WTO from other international 
organizations, contributing to the active engagement of the de-
veloping world. Thus, while it is important to strive for sub-
stantial unification in all major maritime powers from both the 
industrialized and developing world, the absence of GATS of-
fers on all three pillars of sea transport sectors and multimodal 
transport from some will not inevitably result in the overall 
failure of GATS maritime negotiations. If the unification is 
achieved through a progressive process, the developing coun-
tries can tender substantial offers, which meet high standards 
but will be realized through progressive phrases. On balance, 
the aim of the developed world, for instance the U.S., cannot be 
achieved without considerations on the reluctance of the devel-
oping world.  
 
D. Reopening of Maritime Transport Negotiations 
under the WTO Framework 
Based on the historical and doctrinal analyses of maritime 
transport negotiations within the WTO framework, the thesis 
argues that it is feasible to reopen the maritime transport re-
lated negotiations within the WTO framework now. The legal 
setting today is different from it was, and the WTO has been 
much developed since 1995.385  In particular, the TRIPS model 
of unifying intellectual property rights has become full-fledged 
after approximately 20 years’ development. The TRIPS model 
has proved that the WTO is able to unify a fragmented area of 
law,386 and this will reduce the concerns of negotiators against 
opening of maritime transport negotiations. In addition, the 
nature of unifying intellectual property right regimes and uni-
fying seaborne cargo regimes are almost the same. Thus, the 
success of the WTO in the TRIPS model provides the interna-
tional community a feasible way to unify seaborne cargo rules. 
Moreover, the interest parties have recognized the increasing 
importance of maritime transport negotiations, such as in the 
US and other developing countries.387 Chapter Seven will ad-
                                                            
385 See supra Sec. IV (A) and (B). 
386 See supra Sec. III: Cooperation between the WTO and the UN 
387 See supra Sec. IV (B) and (C).  For further details in how to remove bar-
riers to maritime transport negotiations in Lijun Zhao, Soft or Hard law: Ef-
fective Implementation of Uniform Sea Transport Rules through the World 
Trade Organization Framework, INT’L ORG. L. R., 172-227 (2014).	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dress how to remove possible barriers to negotiations and the 
implementation of uniform maritime transport rules. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, sea transport law is governed by conven-
tions. Its harmonization has been negotiated under the UN 
framework; most notably in the Hamburg Rules and recently in 
the Rotterdam Rules since the 1970s. Unfortunately, these two 
UN conventions have had difficulties in achieving worldwide 
ratification in so far so as to form a uniform sea transport re-
gime. Owing to the successful incorporation of another private-
right area of intellectual property into its framework, the WTO 
is likely to cooperate with the UN to foster a uniform sea 
transport regime and to address the issues on unification and 
liberalization in one go under the WTO’s GATS annex. Fur-
thermore, the WTO is an influential worldwide organization 
built upon comprehensive documents and complete legal 
framework.  
The unification of seaborne transport is feasible under the 
GATS, since the WTO has successfully created a uniform IP 
regime under TRIPS. On the whole, the WTO possesses at least 
five advantages in boosting the pace of unification of the sea 
transport regime. First, it has the successful precedent of coop-
eration with the UN’s WIPO in IP regime which can be fol-
lowed in the sea transport regime. Second, the WTO’s unique 
way under TRIPS of dealing with the WTO agreements and 
pre-existing international treaties on IP will shed light on the 
potential reference to previous sea cargo conventions, including 
the UN Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules to the GATS and its 
annex. Third, the WTO has developed a theory of balancing 
rights for the conflicting interest groups from TRIPS and will 
apply it to the maritime transport uniform law negotiations. 
Fourth, the WTO can establish minimum standards under its 
GATS to maintain the criteria of unification for sea transport 
as does TRIPS. Fifth, the WTO institution is effectively imple-
mented under an enforcement procedure under a dispute set-
tlement system. Based on these five merits, the endeavours to 
unify sea transport law will be increasingly accelerated with 
WTO and UN cooperation. 
The relationship between the WTO and maritime 
transport regime can be traced backwards to GATS negotia-
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tions which contained maritime transport negotiations. In light 
of the history of the GATS-based maritime transport negotia-
tions from the 1980s to today, there has been demonstrated a 
trend subject to both progression and regression. Since the 
Uruguay Round, maritime transport services have been inte-
grated into the WTO negotiations for the first time. The neces-
sity of its inclusion had been challenged and confirmed in the 
NGMTS negotiations from 1994 to 1996. The progress achieved 
during this period includes the formation of the specific negoti-
ation forum and a statistical approach based on a wide range of 
questionnaires. Also, it explores a pre-bilateral approach com-
bined with multilateral negotiations to address the problem of 
absence of substantial offers from importance entities, such as 
the US. In order to continue the NGMTS achievements, a sig-
nificant drawback in the current Doha Round, namely the lack 
of a special negotiation platform for maritime transport ser-
vices, should be removed. This is because seaborne transport 
bears trade-off risks, which require an independent negotia-
tions forum and a special annex.  
On the whole, the maritime negotiations within the world 
trading system are divided into three stages in Section V: the 
Uruguay Round (1986-1994), the NGMTS (1994-1997) and Do-
ha Round (2000- ). From the progress and regress within the 
three-stage negotiations, there are primarily three lessons 
learned which shed lights to future uniformity of maritime 
transport regimes. The first lesson is that the dual approach 
introduced within the Uruguay Round, has the beneficiary ef-
fects of expanding the participation of maritime negotiations, 
and of shrinking the trade-off problem. This dual approach was 
continued in the NGMTS negotiations; however, the Doha 
Round negotiations have not maintained it. Future maritime 
negotiations should maintain this dual approach in designing 
negotiating forums and concluding the negotiating results in 
an independent instrument (e.g. an annex) exclusively for mar-
itime transport sector.  
The second lesson regards the ways to engage a number of 
private participants in the shipping industry. In light of the 
NGMTS negotiations, in order to foster communications be-
tween the shipping industry and rule makers, future negotia-
tions should consult non-government entities (e.g. shipowners’ 
council and shippers’ alliances). In future negotiations, the 
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form of their participation is not restricted to the role of ob-
servers. For instance, the WTO can hold workshops similar to 
those the OECD currently holds and allow respective private 
parties to hear and speak out there.388 
The third lesson is on the merits of conducting empirical 
research on maritime transport.389 The questionnaire conduct-
ed by the NGMTS on the maritime transport is a worthwhile 
endeavor due to the general lack of worldwide statistical da-
ta390 concerning the seaborne transport service sector today. 
Even though the questionnaire was conducted in 1994,391 and 
some information is obsolete,392 a number of results are still 
worthy of attention in today’s harmonized system.393 Cabotage 
is generally excluded from sea transport negotiations.394 That 
indicates that negotiators are very conservative on transporta-
tion within their Member’s territories. Similarly, the multi-
modal transport might be a tough issue because of its inland 
transport legs. Thus, further GATS negotiations may discuss 
cabotage and multimodal transport issues but cannot harmo-
nize them at the beginning stages of maritime negotiations. 
Moreover, the unification of sea cargo regulation under the 
GATS already had been initiated by a WTO member’s response 
concerning the minimum standardization of transport service 
and conditions of carriage.395 Accordingly, it is also worthwhile 
                                                            
388 E.g. OECD, Workshop: Measuring the potential of green growth in 
Chile (Santiago, Chile), 
http://www.oecd.org/chile/lowcarbonworkshopchile.htm, accessed Feb. 25, 
2013 (the OECD engages individuals, intergovernmental and non-
government organizations in its workshops). 
389 See supra Sec. IV (B). 
390 Council for Trade in Services, Background Note By Secretariat, 
S/C/W/62 (Nov.16, 1998), at 1-2. The United States triggers the endeavor for 
collecting statistical information in a worldwide spectrum and unique un-
precedented as to world registered tonnage and ownership to be the factual 
basis of further shipping negotiations. 
391 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, supra note 296. 
392 See also WTO, infra note 392. E.g. Question 9 of the questionnaire on 
the information collected on the United Nations Code of Conduct for liner 
Conferences.  
393 Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, supra note 296, at 1. 
394 See WTO, supra note 301; e.g. WTO, Communication from Cyprus-
Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.8, (Feb.6, 1995), at 3. 
395 Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Communication 
from Australia-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.4, (Jan. 24, 1995), at 8 and 12-13; Negotiating Group on 
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of conducting a similar questionnaire in the further to obtain 
more first-hand information.396  
The last lesson is the introduction of the supplementary 
mechanisms, designed in the Uruguay Round and NGMTS ne-
gotiations, may avid tugs of war in negotiations. The two sup-
plementary mechanisms, used in the NGMTS and Doha Round 
negotiations, for multilateral negotiations are helpful to solve 
disagreements, namely procedural rules of negotiations and bi-
lateral negotiations. In order to avoid the deadlock of tugs of 
war in the next negotiations, it might be necessary to impose 
deadlines for all participants to submit offers. 
Therefore, having been an important part of the negotiat-
ing agenda in the Uruguay Round, the NGMTS, and the Doha 
Round, maritime transport may be concluded within an annex 
to the GATS with reference to selected pre-existing conven-
tions. Besides unification, the WTO will also need to tackle 
some shipping-related issues, because they are all components 
of the GATS-based annex on maritime transport.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Maritime Transport Services, Communication from Canada-Supplementary 
Information on the Canadian Response to Questionnaire on Maritime 
Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.5/Suppl1, (Feb.24,1995), at 2 (men-
tioning standards to health in transport). 
396 Background Note By Secretariat, supra note 390. The problem of the 
statistical data vacuum on shipping has been recognized since the Uruguay 
Round. 
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